The FBI, Interpol and the UK's National Crime Agency have accused Meta of making a "purposeful" decision to increase end-to-end encryption in a way that in effect "blindfolds" them to child sex abuse. From a report: The Virtual Global Taskforce, made up of 15 law enforcement agencies, issued a joint statement saying that plans by Facebook and Instagram-parent Meta to expand the use of end-to-end encryption on its platforms were "a purposeful design choice that degrades safety systems," including with regards to protecting children. The law enforcement agencies also warned technology companies more broadly about the need to balance safeguarding children online with protecting users' privacy. "The VGT calls for all industry partners to fully appreciate the impact of implementing system design decisions that result in blindfolding themselves to CSA [child sexual abuse] occurring on their platforms or reduces their capacity to identify CSA and keep children safe," the statement said.

WhatsApp, Signal and other messaging services have urged the UK government to rethink the Online Safety Bill (OSB). From a report: They are concerned that the bill could undermine end-to-end encryption - which means the message can only be read on the sender and the recipient's app and nowhere else. Ministers want the regulator to be able to ask the platforms to monitor users, to root out child abuse images. The government says it is possible to have both privacy and child safety. "We support strong encryption," a government official said, "but this cannot come at the cost of public safety. "Tech companies have a moral duty to ensure they are not blinding themselves and law enforcement to the unprecedented levels of child sexual abuse on their platforms. "The Online Safety Bill in no way represents a ban on end-to-end encryption, nor will it require services to weaken encryption." End-to-end encryption (E2EE) provides the most robust level of security because nobody other than the sender and intended recipient can read the message information. Even the operator of the app cannot unscramble messages as they pass across systems - they can be decrypted only by the people in the chat. "Weakening encryption, undermining privacy and introducing the mass surveillance of people's private communications is not the way forward," an open letter warns.

"What would it look like if we called time on Big Tech's failed experiment?" asks the co-editor of the Oxford-based magazine New Internationalist: A better social media would need to be decentralized... As well as avoiding a single point of failure (or censorship), this would help with other goals: community ownership, and democratic control, would be facilitated by having many smaller, perhaps more local, sites. Existing social media giants must be brought into public (and transnational) ownership — in a way that hands power to citizens, not governments. But they should also be broken up, using existing anti-monopoly rules.

It is hard to know what sort of algorithms would best promote real community until we try... But the algorithms that determine what enters peoples' social feeds must be transparent: open source, open for scrutiny, and for change. We could also adapt from sites like Wikipedia (collectively edited) and Reddit (where posts and comments' visibility is determined by user votes). Moderation policies — what content is and isn't allowed — could be decided collectively, according to groups' needs....

An important step towards a decentralized social network would be interoperability, and data portability. Different sites need to be able to talk to each other (or 'federate'), just as email providers or mobile operators are required to. There's no point being on a site if your friends aren't, but if your server can relay messages to theirs there is less of a barrier. Meanwhile encryption will be vital for privacy.

One particularly intriguing idea is that of artist and software developer Darius Kazemi, who suggests every public library — there are 2.7 million worldwide — could host its own federated social media server. As well as providing local accountability and access, and boosting increasingly defunded neighbourhood assets, these servers would benefit from librarians' expertise in curating information.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: When you first start messing with the command line, it can feel like there's an impermeable wall between the local space you're messing around in and the greater Internet. On your side, you've got your commands and files, and beyond the wall, there are servers, images, APIs, webpages, and more bits of useful, ever-changing data. One of the most popular ways through that wall has been cURL, or "client URL," which turns 25 this month.

The cURL tool started as a way for programmer Daniel Stenberg to let Internet Chat Relay users quickly fetch currency exchange rates while still inside their chat window. As detailed in an archived history of the project, it was originally built off an existing command-line tool, httpget, built by Rafael Sagula. A 1.0 version was released in 1997, then changed names to urlget by 2.0, as it had added in GOPHER, FTP, and other protocols. By 1998, the tool could upload as well as download, and so version 4.0 was named cURL. Over the next few years, cURL grew to encompass nearly every Internet protocol, work with certificates and encryption, offer bindings for more than 50 languages, and be included in most Linux distributions and other systems. The cURL project now encompasses both the command-line command itself and the libcurl library. In 2020, the project's history estimated the command and library had been installed in more than 10 billion instances worldwide.

How do you celebrate a piece of indispensable Internet architecture turning 25? Stenberg plans to host a "Zoom birthday party" at 17:00 UTC time on March 20. Double-check that time in your area: "It is within this weird period between [when] the US has switched to daylight saving time while Europe has not yet switched," Stenberg writes on his blog. Stenberg plans to sip on a 25-year Bowmore Islay single-malt Scotch, while presenting the project's history and future plans while taking questions. (A link to the Zoom call will be added to Stenberg's blog post closer to March 20.)

An anonymous reader quotes a report from The Guardian: WhatsApp would refuse to comply with requirements in the online safety bill that attempted to outlaw end-to-end encryption, the chat app's boss has said, casting the future of the service in the UK in doubt. Speaking during a UK visit in which he will meet legislators to discuss the government's flagship internet regulation, Will Cathcart, Meta's head of WhatsApp, described the bill as the most concerning piece of legislation currently being discussed in the western world.

He said: "It's a remarkable thing to think about. There isn't a way to change it in just one part of the world. Some countries have chosen to block it: that's the reality of shipping a secure product. We've recently been blocked in Iran, for example. But we've never seen a liberal democracy do that. "The reality is, our users all around the world want security," said Cathcart. "Ninety-eight per cent of our users are outside the UK. They do not want us to lower the security of the product, and just as a straightforward matter, it would be an odd choice for us to choose to lower the security of the product in a way that would affect those 98% of users."

The UK government already has the power to demand the removal of encryption thanks to the 2016 investigatory powers act, but WhatsApp has never received a legal demand to do so, Cathcart said. The online safety bill is a concerning expansion of that power, because of the "grey area" in the legislation. Under the bill, the government or Ofcom could require WhatsApp to apply content moderation policies that would be impossible to comply with without removing end-to-end encryption. If the company refused to do, it could face fines of up to 4% of its parent company Meta's annual turnover -- unless it pulled out of the UK market entirely.

schwit1 shares an excerpt from a Substack article, written by former cybersecurity reporter Catalin Cimpanu: The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the tax department of Canada, recently updated its terms and conditions to force taxpayers to agree that CRA is not liable if their personal information is stolen while using the My Account online service portal -- which, ironically, all Canadians must use when doing their taxes and/or running their business. The CRA's terms of use assert the agency is not liable because they have "taken all reasonable steps to ensure the security of this Web site."

Excerpt from the CRA terms statement: "10. The Canada Revenue Agency has taken all reasonable steps to ensure the security of this Web site. We have used sophisticated encryption technology and incorporated other procedures to protect your personal information at all times. However, the Internet is a public network and there is the remote possibility of data security violations. In the event of such occurrences, the Canada Revenue Agency is not responsible for any damages you may experience as a result."

Unfortunately, that is not true. After reviewing the HTTP responses from the CRA My Account login page, it's clear the agency has not configured even some of the most basic security features. For example, security protections for their cookies are not configured, nor are all the recommended security headers used. Not only is that not "all reasonable steps," but the CRA is missing the very basics for securing online web applications.

The terms of use also state that users are not allowed to use "any script, robot, spider, Web crawler, screen scraper, automated query program or other automated device or any manual process to monitor or copy the content contained in any online services." Looking at the HTTP response headers using web browser developer tools doesn't breach the terms of services, but the CRA must be well aware that internet users perform scans like this all the time. And it's not the legitimate My Account users who are likely to be the culprits. Unfortunately for Canadians, threat actors don't read terms of use pages. A statement like this doesn't protect anyone, except CRA, from being held responsible for failing to properly secure Canadian citizens' personal data.

Gmail client-side encryption (CSE) is now generally available for Google Workspace Enterprise Plus, Education Plus, and Education Standard customers. BleepingComputer reports: The feature was first introduced in Gmail on the web as a beta test in December 2022, after being available in Google Drive, Google Docs, Sheets, Slides, Google Meet, and Google Calendar (in beta) since last year. Once enabled, Gmail CSE ensures that any sensitive data sent as part of the email's body and attachments (including inline images) will be unreadable and encrypted before reaching Google's servers. It's also important to note that the email header (including subject, timestamps, and recipients lists) will not be encrypted. "Client-side encryption takes this encryption capability to the next level by ensuring that customers have sole control over their encryption keys -- and thus complete control over all access to their data," Googled explained.

"Starting today, users can send and receive emails or create meeting events with internal colleagues and external parties, knowing that their sensitive data (including inline images and attachments) has been encrypted before it reaches Google servers. As customers retain control over the encryption keys and the identity management service to access those keys, sensitive data is indecipherable to Google and other external entities."

wiredmikey shares a report from SecurityWeek: Password management software firm LastPass says one of its DevOps engineers had a personal home computer hacked and implanted with keylogging malware as part of a sustained cyberattack that exfiltrated corporate data from the cloud storage resources. LastPass on Monday fessed up a "second attack" where an unnamed threat actor combined data stolen from an August breach with information available from a third-party data breach, and a vulnerability in a third-party media software package to launch a coordinated attack. [...]

LastPass worked with incident response experts at Mandiant to perform forensics and found that a DevOps engineer's home computer was targeted to get around security mitigations. The attackers exploited a remote code execution vulnerability in a third-party media software package and planted keylogger malware on the employee's personal computer. "The threat actor was able to capture the employee's master password as it was entered, after the employee authenticated with MFA, and gain access to the DevOps engineer's LastPass corporate vault," the company said. "The threat actor then exported the native corporate vault entries and content of shared folders, which contained encrypted secure notes with access and decryption keys needed to access the AWS S3 LastPass production backups, other cloud-based storage resources, and some related critical database backups," LastPass confirmed. LastPass originally disclosed the breach in August 2022 and warned that "some source code and technical information were stolen."

SecurityWeek adds: "In January 2023, the company said the breach was far worse than originally reported and included the theft of account usernames, salted and hashed passwords, a portion of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) settings, as well as some product settings and licensing information."

Bruce66423 writes: The encrypted-messaging app Signal has said it would stop providing services in the UK if a new law undermined encryption. If forced to weaken the privacy of its messaging system under the Online Safety Bill, the organisation "would absolutely, 100% walk" Signal president Meredith Whittaker told the BBC. The government said its proposal was not "a ban on end-to-end encryption". The bill, introduced by Boris Johnson, is currently going through Parliament. Critics say companies could be required by Ofcom to scan messages on encrypted apps for child sexual abuse material or terrorism content under the new law. This has worried firms whose business is enabling private, secure communication.

"The waiting time for general purpose quantum computers is getting shorter, but they are still probably decades away," notes Security Week.

But "The arrival of cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers that will herald the cryptopocalypse will be much sooner — possibly less than a decade." It is important to note that all PKI-encrypted data that has already been harvested by adversaries is already lost. We can do nothing about the past; we can only attempt to protect the future.... [T]his is not a threat for the future — the threat exists today. Adversaries are known to be stealing and storing encrypted data with the knowledge that within a few years they will be able to access the raw data. This is known as the 'harvest now, decrypt later' threat. Intellectual property and commercial plans — not to mention military secrets — will still be valuable to adversaries when the cryptopocalypse happens.

The one thing we can say with certainty is that it definitely won't happen in 2023 — probably. That probably comes from not knowing for certain what stage in the journey to quantum computing has been achieved by foreign nations or their intelligence agencies — and they're not likely to tell us. Nevertheless, it is assumed that nobody yet has a quantum computer powerful enough to run Shor's algorithm and crack PKI encryption in a meaningful timeframe. It is likely that such computers may become available as soon as three to five years. Most predictions suggest ten years.

Note that a specialized quantum computer designed specifically for Shor does not need to be as powerful as a general-purpose quantum computer — which is more likely to be 20 to 30 years away.... "Quantum computing is not, yet, to the point of rendering conventional encryption useless, at least that we know of, but it is heading that way," comments Mike Parkin, senior technical engineer at Vulcan Cyber. Skip Sanzeri, co-founder and COO at QuSecure, warns that the threat to current encryption is not limited to quantum decryption. "New approaches are being developed promising the same post-quantum cybersecurity threats as a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, only much sooner," he said. "It is also believed that quantum advancements don't have to directly decrypt today's encryption. If they weaken it by suggesting or probabilistically finding some better seeds for a classical algorithm (like the sieve) and make that more efficient, that can result in a successful attack. And it's no stretch to predict, speaking of predictions, that people are going to find ways to hack our encryption that we don't even know about yet."

Steve Weston, co-founder and CTO at Incrypteon, offers a possible illustration. "Where is the threat in 2023 and beyond?" he asks. "Is it the threat from quantum computers, or is the bigger threat from AI? An analysis of cryptoanalysis and code breaking over the last 40 years shows how AI is used now, and will be more so in the future."
The article warns that "the coming cryptopocalypse requires organizations to transition from known quantum-vulnerable encryption (such as current PKI standards) to something that is at least quantum safe if not quantum secure." (The chief revenue officer at Quintessence Labs tells the site that symmetric encryption like AES-256 "is theorized to be quantum safe, but one can speculate that key sizes will soon double.")

"The only quantum secure cryptography known is the one-time pad."

Thanks to Slashdot reader wiredmikey for sharing the article.

System76 is announcing a "fully redesigned" version of its AMD-only Linux-powered "Pangolin" laptop with an upgraded memory, storage, processor, and display.

9to5Linux reports: It features the AMD Ryzen 7 6800U processor with up to 4.7 GHz clock speeds, 8 cores, 16 threads, and AMD Radeon 680M integrated graphics.... a 15.6-inch 144Hz Full HD (1920 x 1080) display [using 12 integrated Radeon graphics cores] with a matte finish, a sleek magnesium alloy chassis, and promises up to 10 hours of battery life with its 70 Wh Li-Ion battery. It also features a single-color backlit US QWERTY Keyboard and a multitouch clickpad. Under the hood, the Linux-powered laptop boasts 32 GB LPDDR5 6400 MHz of RAM and it can be equipped with up to 16TB PCIe 4.0 NVMe M.2 SSD storage. Another cool feature is the hardware camera kill switch for extra privacy....

As with all of System76's Linux-powered laptops, the all-new Pangolin comes pre-installed with System76's in-house built Pop!_OS Linux distribution featuring the GNOME-based COSMIC desktop and full disk-encryption or with Ubuntu 22.04 LTS.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that ASCON is the winning bid for the "lightweight cryptography" program to find the best algorithm to protect small IoT (Internet of Things) devices with limited hardware resources. BleepingComputer reports: ASCON was selected as the best of the 57 proposals submitted to NIST, several rounds of security analysis by leading cryptographers, implementation and benchmarking results, and feedback received during workshops. The whole program lasted for four years, having started in 2019. NIST says all ten finalists exhibited exceptional performance that surpassed the set standards without raising security concerns, making the final selection very hard.

ASCON was eventually picked as the winner for being flexible, encompassing seven families, energy efficient, speedy on weak hardware, and having low overhead for short messages. NIST also considered that the algorithm had withstood the test of time, having been developed in 2014 by a team of cryptographers from Graz University of Technology, Infineon Technologies, Lamarr Security Research, and Radboud University, and winning the CAESAR cryptographic competition's "lightweight encryption" category in 2019.

Two of ASCON's native features highlighted in NIST's announcement are AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) and hashing. AEAD is an encryption mode that provides confidentiality and authenticity for transmitted or stored data, combining symmetric encryption and MAC (message authentication code) to prevent unauthorized access or tampering. Hashing is a data integrity verification mechanism that creates a string of characters (hash) from unique inputs, allowing two data exchange points to validate that the encrypted message has not been tampered with. Despite ASCON's lightweight nature, NIST says the scheme is powerful enough to offer some resistance to attacks from powerful quantum computers at its standard 128-bit nonce. However, this is not the goal or purpose of this standard, and lightweight cryptography algorithms should only be used for protecting ephemeral secrets. For more details on ASCON, check the algorithm's website, or read the technical paper (PDF) submitted to NIST in May 2021.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Motherboard: A section of the UK government has proposed making the sale or possession of bespoke encrypted phones for crime a criminal offense in its own right. The measure is intended to help the country's law enforcement agencies tackle organized crime and those who facilitate it, but civil liberties experts tell Motherboard the proposal is overbroad and poorly defined, meaning it could sweep up other forms of secure communication used by the wider population if not adjusted. "At the moment the government proposal appears to be vague and overly broad. While it states that the provisions 'will not apply to commercially available mobile phones nor the encrypted messaging apps available on them' it is difficult to see how it will not result in targeting devices used on a daily [basis] by human rights defenders, protesters and pretty much all of us who want to keep our data secure," Ioannis Kouvakas, senior legal officer and assistant general counsel at UK-based activism organization Privacy International, told Motherboard in an email.

The proposal is included in a document published by the Home Office (PDF). In that document, the Home Office proposes two legislative measures that it says could be used to improve law enforcement's response to serious and organized crime, and is seeking input from law enforcement, businesses, lawyers, civil liberties NGOs, and the wider public. [...] The first measure looks to create new criminal offenses on the "making, modifying, supply, offering to supply and possession of articles for use in serious crime." The document points to several specific items: vehicle concealments used to hide illicit goods; digital templates for 3D-printing firearms; pill presses used in the drug trade; and "sophisticated encrypted communication devices used to facilitate organized crime." In other words, this change would criminalize owning an encrypted phone, selling one, or making one for use in crime, a crime in itself. [...]

With encrypted phones, the Home Office writes that both the encryption itself and modifications made to the phones are creating "considerable barriers" to law enforcement. Typically, phones from this industry use end-to-end encryption, meaning that messages are encrypted before leaving the device, rendering any interception by law enforcement ineffective. (Multiple agencies have instead found misconfigurations in how companies' encryption works, or hacked into firms, to circumvent this protection). Encrypted phone companies sometimes physically remove the microphone, camera, and GPS functionality from handsets too. Often distributors sell these phones for thousands of dollars for yearly subscriptions. Given that price, the Home Office says it is "harder to foresee a need for anyone to use them for legitimate, legal reasons." The Home Office adds that under one option for legislation, laws could still criminalize people who did not suspect the technology would be used for serious crime, simply because the technology is so "closely associated with serious crime." Potential signs could include someone paying for a phone "through means which disguise the identity of the payer," the document reads. Often distributors sell phones for Bitcoin or cash, according to multiple encrypted phone sellers that spoke to Motherboard. The document says "the provisions will not apply to commercially available mobile phones nor the encrypted messaging apps available on them." But the Home Office does not yet have a settled definition of what encompasses "sophisticated encrypted communication devices," leaving open the question of what exactly the UK would be prepared to charge a person for possessing or selling.

Russian antiwar activists placed their faith in Telegram, a supposedly secure messaging app. How does Putin's regime seem to know their every move? From a report: Matsapulina's case [anecdote in the story] is hardly an isolated one, though it is especially unsettling. Over the past year, numerous dissidents across Russia have found their Telegram accounts seemingly monitored or compromised. Hundreds have had their Telegram activity wielded against them in criminal cases. Perhaps most disturbingly, some activists have found their "secret chats" -- Telegram's purportedly ironclad, end-to-end encrypted feature -- behaving strangely, in ways that suggest an unwelcome third party might be eavesdropping.

These cases have set off a swirl of conspiracy theories, paranoia, and speculation among dissidents, whose trust in Telegram has plummeted. In many cases, it's impossible to tell what's really happening to people's accounts -- whether spyware or Kremlin informants have been used to break in, through no particular fault of the company; whether Telegram really is cooperating with Moscow; or whether it's such an inherently unsafe platform that the latter is merely what appears to be going on.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from The Verge: First, Anker told us it was impossible. Then, it covered its tracks. It repeatedly deflected while utterly ignoring our emails. So shortly before Christmas, we gave the company an ultimatum: if Anker wouldn't answer why its supposedly always-encrypted Eufy cameras were producing unencrypted streams -- among other questions -- we would publish a story about the company's lack of answers. It worked.

In a series of emails to The Verge, Anker has finally admitted its Eufy security cameras are not natively end-to-end encrypted -- they can and did produce unencrypted video streams for Eufy's web portal, like the ones we accessed from across the United States using an ordinary media player. But Anker says that's now largely fixed. Every video stream request originating from Eufy's web portal will now be end-to-end encrypted -- like they are with Eufy's app -- and the company says it's updating every single Eufy camera to use WebRTC, which is encrypted by default. Reading between the lines, though, it seems that these cameras could still produce unencrypted footage upon request.

That's not all Anker is disclosing today. The company has apologized for the lack of communication and promised to do better, confirming it's bringing in outside security and penetration testing companies to audit Eufy's practices, is in talks with a "leading and well-known security expert" to produce an independent report, is promising to create an official bug bounty program, and will launch a microsite in February to explain how its security works in more detail. Those independent audits and reports may be critical for Eufy to regain trust because of how the company has handled the findings of security researchers and journalists. It's a little hard to take the company at its word! But we also think Anker Eufy customers, security researchers and journalists deserve to read and weigh those words, particularly after so little initial communication from the company. That's why we're publishing Anker's full responses [here]. As highlighted by Ars Technica, some of the notable statements include: - Its web portal now prohibits users from entering "debug mode."
- Video stream content is encrypted and inaccessible outside the portal.
- While "only 0.1 percent" of current daily users access the portal, it "had some issues," which have been resolved.
- Eufy is pushing WebRTC to all of its security devices as the end-to-end encrypted stream protocol.
- Facial recognition images were uploaded to the cloud to aid in replacing/resetting/adding doorbells with existing image sets, but has been discontinued. No recognition data was included with images sent to the cloud.
- Outside of the "recent issue with the web portal," all other video uses end-to-end encryption.
- A "leading and well-known security expert" will produce a report about Eufy's systems.
- "Several new security consulting, certification, and penetration testing" firms will be brought in for risk assessment.
- A "Eufy Security bounty program" will be established.
- The company promises to "provide more timely updates in our community (and to the media!)."

GoTo (formerly LogMeIn) is warning customers that threat actors who breached its development environment in November 2022 stole encrypted backups containing customer information and an encryption key for a portion of that data. From a report: GoTo provides a platform for cloud-based remote working, collaboration, and communication, as well as remote IT management and technical support solutions. In November 2022, the company disclosed a security breach on its development environment and a cloud storage service used by both them and its affiliate, LastPass. At the time, the impact on the client data had yet to become known as the company's investigation into the incident with the help of cybersecurity firm Mandiant had just begun.

The internal investigation so far has revealed that the incident had a significant impact on GoTo's customers. According to a GoTo's security incident notification a reader shared with BleepingComputer, the attack affected backups relating to the Central and Pro product tiers stored in a third-party cloud storage facility. "Our investigation to date has determined that a threat actor exfiltrated encrypted backups related to Central and Pro from a third-party cloud storage facility," reads the notice to customers.

Apple today announced that Advanced Data Protection is expanding beyond the United States. MacRumors reports: Starting with iOS 16.3, the security feature will be available globally, giving users to option to enable end-to-end encryption for many additional iCloud data categories, including Photos, Notes, Voice Memos, Messages backups, device backups, and more. iOS 16.3 is currently in beta and expected to be released to the public next week.

By default, Apple stores encryption keys for some iCloud data types on its servers to ensure that users can recover their data if they lose access to their Apple ID account. If a user enables Advanced Data Protection, the encryption keys are deleted from Apple's servers and stored on a user's devices only, preventing Apple, law enforcement, or anyone else from accessing the data, even if iCloud servers were to be breached.

iCloud already provides end-to-end encryption for 14 data categories without Advanced Data Protection turned on, including Messages (excluding backups), passwords stored in iCloud Keychain, Health data, Apple Maps search history, Apple Card transactions, and more. Advanced Data Protection expands this protection to the vast majority of iCloud categories, with major exceptions including the Mail, Contacts, and Calendar apps. For more information, you can read Apple's Advanced Data Protection support document.

Last month, CircleCI urged users to rotate their secrets following a breach of the company's systems. The company confirmed in a blog post on Friday that some customers' data was stolen in the breach. While the customer data was encrypted, cybercriminals obtained the encryption keys able to decrypt the data. TechCrunch reports: The company said in a detailed blog post on Friday that it identified the intruder's initial point of access as an employee's laptop that was compromised with malware, allowing the theft of session tokens used to keep the employee logged in to certain applications, even though their access was protected with two-factor authentication. The company took the blame for the compromise, calling it a "systems failure," adding that its antivirus software failed to detect the token-stealing malware on the employee's laptop. Session tokens allow a user to stay logged in without having to keep re-entering their password or re-authorizing using two-factor authentication each time. But a stolen session token allows an intruder to gain the same access as the account holder without needing their password or two-factor code. As such, it can be difficult to differentiate between a session token of the account owner, or a hacker who stole the token.

CircleCi said the theft of the session token allowed the cybercriminals to impersonate the employee and gain access to some of the company's production systems, which store customer data. "Because the targeted employee had privileges to generate production access tokens as part of the employee's regular duties, the unauthorized third party was able to access and exfiltrate data from a subset of databases and stores, including customer environment variables, tokens, and keys," said Rob Zuber, the company's chief technology officer. Zuber said the intruders had access from December 16 through January 4.

Zuber said that while customer data was encrypted, the cybercriminals also obtained the encryption keys able to decrypt customer data. "We encourage customers who have yet to take action to do so in order to prevent unauthorized access to third-party systems and stores," Zuber added. Several customers have already informed CircleCi of unauthorized access to their systems, Zuber said. Zuber said that CircleCi employees who retain access to production systems "have added additional step-up authentication steps and controls," which should prevent a repeat-incident, likely by way of using hardware security keys.

Watch a rare launch of SpaceX's massive Falcon Heavy rocket livestreamed on SpaceX's YouTube channel.

"Nearly five years have passed since the massive Falcon Heavy rocket made its successful debut launch in February 2018," writes Ars Technica.

"Since then, however, SpaceX's heavy lift rocket has flown just three additional times." Why? It's partly because there is simply not all that much demand for a heavy lift rocket. Another factor is that SpaceX has increased the performance of its Falcon 9 rocket so much that it can complete a lot of the missions originally manifested on the Falcon Heavy. However the main reason for the low cadence has been due to a lack of readiness of payloads for the new rocket, particularly from the US Department of Defense. But now this trickle of Falcon Heavy launches may turn into a flood. [Sunday's launch is the first of potentially five launches this year]

SpaceX completed a hot fire test of the rocket on Tuesday, and declared that the vehicle was ready for liftoff. The rocket will use a brand new core stage, and side-mounted boosters that have flown into space one time, as side-mounted boosters on the USSF-44 Falcon Heavy mission that launched on November 1 2022.
What's it carrying? Space.com writes: The main payload is a military communications satellite called Continuous Broadcast Augmenting SATCOM 2, which the Falcon Heavy will send to geostationary orbit, about 22,200 miles (35,700 kilometers) above Earth. Also flying Saturday is a rideshare spacecraft called Long Duration Propulsive ESPA (LDPE)-3A, a payload adapter that can hold up to six small satellites, according to EverydayAstronaut.com. LDPE-3A will carry five Space Force payloads on USSF-67. Among them are "two operational prototypes for enhanced situational awareness and an operational prototype crypto/interface encryption payload providing secure space-to-ground communications capability," Space Force officials said in an emailed statement on Friday....

If all goes according to plan, the two side boosters will come back to Earth shortly after liftoff on Sunday, making vertical touchdowns at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, which is next door to NASA's Kennedy Space Center. The central booster will not return, instead ditching into the Atlantic Ocean....

USSF-67 is part of a busy week for SpaceX. The company also plans to launch 51 of its Starlink internet satellites to low Earth orbit atop a Falcon 9 on Thursday, January 19.

Microsoft is introducing a new consumer tier to its Microsoft 365 subscription offerings. From a report: Priced at $1.99 per month, Microsoft 365 Basic is designed to replace the 100GB OneDrive storage option with some extra features that sit in between the free option and the $6.99 a month Personal subscription. Microsoft 365 Basic will be available worldwide on January 30th with 100GB of cloud storage, an ad-free Outlook web and mobile experience, and enhanced security features. The security features include data encryption for an Outlook mailbox, suspicious link checking, and virus / malware scanning for attachments. Existing OneDrive 100GB storage customers will be automatically upgraded to Microsoft 365 Basic at the same $1.99 monthly rate. [...] The main difference between the $6.99 Personal subscription and this new $1.99 Basic one (other than the amount of cloud storage) is that Microsoft 365 Basic doesn't include access to the desktop versions of Word, Excel, and PowerPoint apps. Basic subscribers will have to use the web or mobile versions instead.