Seeking Current Info on Linux Encrypted FS? 297
slick_rick asks: "I'm looking for info on encrypted file systems under Linux to help my employers company move away from Microsoft centric solutions. However the latest HOWTO is two years old, the latest kernel patch dates back to April (and 2.4.3) and even the Sourceforge project has nearly zero documentation and appears to be very dead. Are slashdotters using encrypted file systems? If so, what are your experiences?" We last talked about this topic, just
over a year ago, in this article.
win2k (Score:1)
Tell them that!
Re:win2k (Score:2, Informative)
Tell them that!
Ever heard of a File Recovery Agent? There's one set up by default on every Win2k system. And it gets better... you can add more!
Re:win2k (Score:1)
And it gets better... you can add more!
Add more what?
Re:win2k (Score:4, Informative)
I read it uses AES
I would assume a key/certificate/whatever is stored in the user account profile....
But what prevents Administrator from changing your password, and signing into your account to read your files? I suppose this leaves a trail... but still.
The certificate is stored on the user's workstation. If they use multiple workstations, the user must carry their certificate with them. EFS works using 128-bit DESX. A symmetrical recovery key is generated and is encrypted using the Recovery Agent(s) public key, so that those people designated as people who can decrypt other's files can do so.
For those who still can't understand this, and think that a cracked account/BO Trojan and other absurd conditions are going to make a difference, the answer is Very Little. An agent still needs the certificate installed on the workstation that he/she is going to be recovering files from. Microsoft even recommends that a certificate be generated, the public key added as a recovery agent, and the certificate kept on removable media and stored securely until it is needed. They also recommend storing the certificate as a PKCS#12 cert since you can lock the private key with a password.
An Admin can't just change your password and sign in as you, unless he can do it at your workstation or wherever you have your certificate installed. He may be a designated Recovery Agent, though in which he can look at your files anyway. But this has always been the case on windows network, but even on Unix/Linux nobody can stop root from reading a file, right?
FreeBSD & NFS (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:FreeBSD & NFS (Score:5, Informative)
This is CFS, Matt Blaze's Cryptographic File System. It provides transparent encryption and decryption of selected directory trees. It is implemented as a user-level NFS server and thus does not require any kernel modifications.
ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/cfs.ps
Re:Which is better for FreeBSD? CFS or Rubberhose? (Score:2)
I don't see why this question is relevant. I have been using CFS for 3+ years on FreeBSD 2, 3, and 4, without a hitch. There does not seem to be a need for being 'updated'. It works very well.
Re:FreeBSD & NFS (Score:3, Informative)
Try SuSE. Because they are a European distro (ie no problems with US export controls), and also aimed at secure/server market (unlike mandrake), they have Very Good built in security measures. It is really very trivial to set up a crypto file system. You really should give it a go. See this [suse.com] for some breif details.
Only problem is SuSE dont make iso's downloadable, so you might need to buy (gasp!) a copy. Money well worth spent though.
loop-AES (Score:4, Informative)
Re:loop-AES (Score:1)
Stuck in Windows? Bestcrypt works okay... (Score:4, Informative)
BC allows you to create encrypted volumes up to the max size of your harddrive, and encrypts anything therein with your choice of encryption schemas. It also comes with a 'Wipe' command that will allow you to delete a file or clean a drive with a 7-stage delete process.
Re:Stuck in Windows? Bestcrypt works okay... (Score:1)
For windows there is something coming along with PGP that allows you the creating of encrypted drives
Re:Stuck in Windows? Bestcrypt works okay... (Score:2)
E4M [e4m.com] is a free (beer) windows solution, that is also open source. It works by making encrypted volumns that can be mounted as virtual drives under win32.
D'oh! Checked the link. Guess the project died. Well, maybe you can luck out and find a mirror.
Reiser4 (Score:5, Informative)
Encryption is fine. Decryption doesn't work (Score:3, Funny)
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Re:Encryption is fine. Decryption doesn't work (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Encryption is fine. Decryption doesn't work (Score:2)
SuSE does this out of the box... (Score:5, Informative)
Note that this filesystem based encryption, not user based. I.e. you must enter a password to mount the filesystem, but after that it acts as a normal filesystem (but slower due to the aforementioned encryption).
The way that SuSE do it is to have an encrypted block device, so that you can throw anything you want on top of it. Typically this would be a filesytem ;-)
From the SuSE webpage:
Re:SuSE does this out of the box... (Score:5, Informative)
- Login Bios Password (Yeah, no security there I know)
- crypto FS
- OS Security
Now the two weak links are the BIOS password as well as the OS Security (just boot from CDROM and on you go), but everything on the
Really neat.
Michael
Re:SuSE does this out of the box... (Score:4, Insightful)
It would be convinient if you could have multiple entries in fstab share the same password, for now a little shell script will do (also because Aurora [dhs.org] doesn't support text input yet).
swap encryption ? use OpenBSD (Score:4, Informative)
By setting just one sysctl [openbsd.org] (vm.swapencrypt.enable=1)OpenBSD [openbsd.org] encrypt its swap using AES.
You just have to uncomment one line in /etc/sysctl.conf to activate it permanently.
Re:SuSE does this out of the box... (Score:2)
Re:SuSE does this out of the box... (Score:5, Interesting)
Also, you can get all of the patches [ftp.gwdg.de] that SuSE use on their kernel, not only this one. Please note that this link is
XOR encryption is supported out of the box... (Score:4, Informative)
Re:XOR encryption is supported out of the box... (Score:2, Informative)
cat
Re:XOR encryption is supported out of the box... (Score:1)
However, remembering a 4GB key might be a little difficult, and not really that much easier than just remembering the data.
I used it on Suse (Score:1)
Deniability (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Deniability (Score:1)
Maybe for you.... (Score:5, Interesting)
Personally, I don't want my doctor to have deniability about his records regarding me. Or my lawyer. Or my accountant. And most especially not my banker, financial adviser, etc.
In fact, for these people deniability makes a solution look much less attractive. People get *really* nervous when their accountant or lawyer has strong deniability about what the advice they gave you, about where your money went, etc.
Re:Maybe for you.... (Score:2)
Re:Deniability (Score:4, Insightful)
The presence of Rubberhose software and a huge segment of random noise on the disk is going to be enough to convince a court that you have a Rubberhose partition.
The suggested "create 1GB of noise and then put two partitions in it, and just say you've got one" isn't going to work either. The court is gonna say "oh, you've got 1GB of noise according to our expert, but only a 300MB partition with nothing incriminating on it? Yeah, right, buddy; gimme the password for the other 700MB partition or you can rot in jail on contempt".
Even a couple megs of "unused" space is going to be taken as a sign you've got a small partition hidden, if you've got Rubberhose software on the system to access it.
Steganography only works when the carrier files have utility beyond that of the hypothetical encrypted information.
Re:Deniability (Score:3, Funny)
1) There's an encrypted partition, but I forgot the password.
2) There's software for accessing steganized encrypted partitions, with documentation that recommends creating a large chunk of noise to hide it in, and there's a large chunk of noise, but there's no partition, I just keep random noise on my 2GB drive and only use this 1GB partition, the rest is just where I store the random noise, honest.
Re:Deniability (Score:2)
This article [richmond.edu] comes to the conclusion:
But that means nothing compared to actual precendence, of which I am not aware, 'cause I don't really keep up with this stuff. I assume it's protected, as the recent case against that mobster was borderline and it wasn't a question of whether the guy would be forced to give his password, but what to do once it had been aquired.Re:Deniability (Score:3, Informative)
There's a great analysis on the Rubberhose web site, talking about the legal precedents and arguments currently existing.
The argument that Fifth Amendment protection doesn't extend to things you've already said, such as information on a hard drive already, is scary, even if you don't find it compelling. Courts don't always rule in accordance with a particular interpretation of the law, much less in accordance with logic.
Re:Deniability (Score:2)
And then they give you immunity from anything you say in the passphrase, which the court will NOT extend to what's in the documents revealed by it.
Re:Deniability (Score:4, Funny)
use OutGuess [outguess.org] and store your data across your porn jpegs! I've been collecting porn over the past 8 years for just this purpose!!!
the judge is *most* likely to believe:
"Your Honour, all those files are of naked men and women getting it on. i have 40+ gigs of it for variety!"
like you said...
Steganography only works when the carrier files have utility beyond that of the hypothetical encrypted information.
Re:Deniability (Score:2, Funny)
Re:Deniability (Score:2)
Yes, and the judge's expert, who will have read the documentation including the guide, will say "if you only wanted to use 400MB of your disk and didn't have anything incriminating to hide, why would you be using a program designed to do this kind of hiding in the first place."
In fact, as they imply in the discussion on physical coercion, not being able to demonstrate usage of all 100% of the space may get you into more trouble.
The partition "looks like" 1GB, but the fact that's only got 400MB of data is suspicious.
And what happens if the court's expert writes out 600MB of data to "fill" the partition? You better be a pretty good actor, or he'll see in your face that he's gonna overwrite your data. Hope it wasn't important data. It's in his best interest to wipe out YOUR copy and keep his copies. You'll never get them back.
So it's a little deniability for unimportant data, but the court isn't gonna buy that you installed this stuff to protect unimportant data.
Re:Deniability (Score:2)
If by complete deniability you mean "the moral satisfaction of knowing they can't prove you're lying", then yes, it's complete deniability.
If you mean "they are likely to believe me and let me out of jail or stop hitting me with this rubber hose", then no, there's not complete deniability.
Of course they know you're using rubberhose so you eventually give up the password to the 100 megs of anarchy and bomb making literature..... all the while your meg or 2 of accounting for you drug dealings is safe.
Except now they have proof you were lying, and they haven't found what they came for.
Far better would be a password that shows them the 400 MB of innocent stuff and IMMEDIATELY deletes all the rest. That would give you plausible deniability.
Re:Deniability (Score:2)
This is an important point. If they don't believe you then you can get tortured no matter what. In the US they will simply ship you to israel where torture is legal and then the israeli govt can tell the US what you confessed to dusring your rape with an electrical dildo.
Re:Deniability (Score:2)
I live in the US and majored in pre-law. But more importantly, I can READ. You should at the very least pop on over to the Rubberhose web page and read the legal analysis there.
Fifth Amendment protection does NOT extend to things you have already uttered. Unless the passphrase itself incriminates you, the 5th amendment does not protect you.
Further, by extending you transactional immunity for the passphrase, they eliminate your 5th amendment options entirely.
50 ways to leave your lover (Score:4, Informative)
http://koeln.ccc.de/~drt/crypto/linux-disk.html
gives them.
cryptfs (Score:4, Informative)
Cryptfs is fully functional, though it was indented mostly as a proof of concept. The point is that such file systems are not hard to build, should someone want to maintain one. Here's an undergraduate programming assignment [nyu.edu] in which the students build a fully-functional cryptographic file system as an NFS loopback server.
crypto filesystems "easy" (Score:2)
Some quick examples:
1) Is a standard cipher used? (easy, now that libraries are widely available)
2) Is a standard cipher used *correctly*? (e.g., no ECB mode!)
3) Does the same data in two blocks encrypt to the same ciphertext? If not, how are you randomizing them? What happens if you copy an encrypted FS from one media to another, e.g., via backups?
4) How do you detect an incorrect encryption key?
There's then the whole issue of key management, the truly hard part. How do you generate the key from the password? How do you support multiple users on the encrypted file system? (N.B., this is cryptospeek for "how do you prevent disgruntled employees from encrypting your data then walking away?" This usually means secondary and even tertiary keys automatically inserted by the system.) How do you handle system reboots?
Finally there's the mundane. Top of that list - how do you handle backups? Can you back up the encrypted data? Can you deny backups of the unencrypted data?
More recent CryptoAPI patches can be found at... (Score:2, Informative)
Try that
It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:5, Insightful)
One level up from your Linux source tree (typically
zcat ~/patch-int-2.4.3.1.gz | patch -p0 -E
You'll notice a chunk fails. The ONLY problem here is patching the root Makefile. Look at the file
CRYPTO = crypto/crypto.o
And changing the line
SUBDIRS = kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib
to...
SUBDIRS = kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto
Now your kernel should be properly patched. Make it mrproper, then configure as needed. Add the proper cyphers (I'm sure you can figure this out). Typically, serpent and blowfish are the best choices. Also, build them as modules so you can harvest a little extra entropy.
Now for the easy part. Once you have the kernel modules built and loaded, make sure you have the latest mount tools (including losetup). Pick the device file you want to use as an encrypted file system. For this example, I'm going to use hda3 with 256 bit serpent encryption for shits & giggles.
losetup --keybits 256 --encryption serpent
It will prompt you for a pass phrase. Use a PHRASE and REMEMBER this. You cannot change the passphrase of an encrypted fs after you set it. Get it right. Next, format the device
mkreiserfs
Now, destroy the loopback device...
losetup -d
And add the following line to your
/dev/hda3
Now, every time you boot or mount that file system, it will ask you for the key length and the pass phrase. And there you go. Encrypted file system. Yea.
You can see how trivially easy that was and if you had put about half an hour's thought into it, you could have realized that the "outdated" howto hasn't been updated because the process is pretty much unchanged and you would not have wasted our time with yet another linux newbie Ask
CFS works great (Score:1)
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:2, Insightful)
Right.
That kind of attitude will really encourage people in general to use Linux and encryption on a daily basis...
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:3, Interesting)
Maybe having an encrypted file system could be part of the install process for upcoming Linux distributions - an easy to use system for encryption in the partitioning stage of the install. Couple that with a runtime tool that can create encrypted partitions after the install, and you immediately have another big plus point over Windows, especially for people in government who have a habit of leaving laptops with top secret material on in taxi cabs.
In other news, the UK government is going to buy 500,000 copies of Windows XP. As a taxpayer, I disagree with this use of my tax money, and with the close relationship that the current government has with Microsoft. I feel that the best solution for the taxpayers is not being researched in the name of PR and photo opportunities for government ministers. And why does the government need to upgrade their computer system to Windows XP? What is wrong with 2000 - a proven OS now, not a just released one...
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:1)
I imagine the other distros won't be far behind.
Ewan
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:3, Interesting)
I constantly have to defend myself against being called part of a cult that is "drinking the Kool-Aid" and this type of attitude does not help. I am proud to be a geek/nerd, but the moment anyone thinks of me as arrogant or haughty, I feel bad.
Apologies (Score:3, Insightful)
Nonetheless, I'm sorry for spoiling something informative with some elitist babble. It's just a knee-jerk reaction from time to time.
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:2)
Actually, I remember reading (mailing list? cryptoapi doc? newsgroup?) that the patch-int should NOT be used, because the implementation of several cyphers (twofish comes to mind) is broken.
As I already wrote in another post, I didn't do extensive testing to compare patch-int and cryptoapi, but I *did* have lost data with patch-int: some files got garbled beyond repair (to quantify, I'd say less than 1% of them). I was using twofish.
Now I'm using cryptoapi, and I didn't have any trouble (at least not yet).
Another point: you may have troubles with losetup/mount, depending on the distribution you use. In that case, download util-linux from the kernel site, apply the patches and recompile. I keep two separate copies (called losetup-crypto and (u)mount-crypto) of the utilities.
I don't think I agree with the the suggestion about reiserfs. ReiserFS has no trouble with fsck simply because it doesn't do fsck... I'd suggest use whatever you want but disable auto-checking or, even better, modify the startup scripts to make sure that the passphrase is good (just try to mount the fs) before attempting a fsck.
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:3, Informative)
I had this problem once or twice, but using either serpent or blowfish. It happened after typing a bad passphrase... and e2fsck kicked in and complained about fs errors. Of course, I've gone a little crazy with my set up. I have two hard disks, each encrypted with a different algorithm, that are then interleaved using RAID0. I love it.
Now I'm using cryptoapi, and I didn't have any trouble (at least not yet).
Got any links or should I just look in standard locations? (Kernel archives, freshmeat?)
Another point: you may have troubles with losetup/mount, depending on the distribution you use. In that case, download util-linux from the kernel site, apply the patches and recompile. I keep two separate copies (called losetup-crypto and (u)mount-crypto) of the utilities.
That's one reason I mentioned having the latest utilities. Older versions don't support crypto stuff (obviously). But there's really nothing wrong with making hte latest util-linux package your primary. Why do you keep separate binaries?
I don't think I agree with the the suggestion about reiserfs. ReiserFS has no trouble with fsck simply because it doesn't do fsck... I'd suggest use whatever you want but disable auto-checking or, even better, modify the startup scripts to make sure that the passphrase is good (just try to mount the fs) before attempting a fsck.
Well, I suggested Reiser because in light of things not being set up properly, I think it's a little more careful before it goes and tries to replay a journal on a corrupted fs. That may actually be a positive fault here, as giving up early protects your data. In general though, I prefer a journaled fs so I'm boasting some advocacy here.
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:2)
It's the one at cryptoapi.sourceforge.net. I didn't mention a link since it was in the story submission.
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:2, Insightful)
Young'un
Maybe he just forgot his password on an encrypted file system that he couldn't mount?
Re:It's Really Pretty Trivial (Score:2)
Ahem!
Try BestCrypt (Score:4, Informative)
Like I said, it's not a filesystem, but it might get you by. I personally don't care if /etc is encrypted or not. But I might care if /home was encrypted. It's easy enough to mount a BestCrypt container file at /home, so that might be enough.
-B
I'm using the "old" sourceforge thing.... (Score:2)
Apart from that I never had any problem with it, but I admit that I never did much testing.
CFS (Score:2, Interesting)
It works well. I'm no security expert buy I can see a couple of problems with it. Firstly it uses triple-DES. Probably secure enough, but not so fast. There are certainly more suitable ciphers out there.
The key comes from a pass phrase. cfs forces you to have a pass-phrase with at least enough bits to fill the DES keys, but obviously unless you like memorizing long strings of random charcters there will be far less entropy than required in the key.
Secondly meta-data is not encrypted. So, although Eve can't tell what is in a particular file, she can see the directory structure (but not filenames) and when a file was created/modified/accesses.
Apart from these criticisms it seems quite good. Users can create/attach/detach encrypted filesystems without special priveledges. You can specify a timeout on a file store so it is dettached after a certain period.
Question to Cliff: Why does this help? (Score:1)
Re:Question to Cliff: Why does this help? (Score:1)
SUSE has it (Score:2, Redundant)
RubberHose (Score:2, Redundant)
The Rubberhose encrypted filesystem might be more suitable for individuals.
Read about it at www.rubberhose.org [rubberhose.org]. It's primary feature is deniability, (from their web page)
Rubberhose is a computer program which both transparently encrypts data on a storage device, such as a hard drive, and allows you to hide that encrypted data. Unlike conventional disk encryption systems, Rubberhose is the first successful, freely available, practical program of deniable cryptography in the world. It was released in an earlier form in 1997, but has undergone significant changes since that time. The design goal has been to make Rubberhose the most efficient conventional disk encryption system, while also offering the new feature of information hiding.
Rubberhose is a type of deniable cryptography package. Deniable cryptography gives a person not wanting to disclose the plaintext data corresponding to their encrypted material the ability to show that there is more than one interpretation of the encrypted data. What deniable crypto means in the Rubberhose context is this: if someone grabs your Rubberhose-encrypted hard drive, he or she will know there is encrypted material on it, but not how much -- thus allowing you to hide the existence of some of your data.Re:RubberHose (Score:2)
StegFS (Linux only) is another steganographic filesystem. It's licensed under the GNU GPL, unlike Rubberhose.
http://www.mcdonald.org.uk/StegFS/ [mcdonald.org.uk]
stegfs (Score:2)
Hopefully! this is my data, not my lottery ticket! i need a bit more reliability than a "hopefully".
i haven't used StegFS, though, so perhaps this hopefully works out to be more theoretical than it sounds, but i'd still like a guarantee that my data will be there unless i choose to delete it. Yeah i know that's tough given the whole deniability thing, but still, i'd like that guarantee.
Re:stegfs (Score:2)
Read further, and you probably won't be as worried.
Only when the filesystem is mounted at a lower access level (or as a plain ext2 filesystem) is there a danger of overwriting blocks of encrypted data.
If you're always using the filesystem with the highest access level, you don't have anything to worry about. It's only when there's a lot of data being written at a lower level that you have to worry.
If that's the case, like it's a partition that contains home directories for other users, you're already asking for trouble. This should be a filesystem that only you use on a regular basis.
Re:Q about Rubberhose. - maybe this (Score:2)
CryptoAPI (Score:5, Informative)
I've used it the last 2 years (Score:5, Insightful)
For the past two years, I've been using it in several distributions, manually applying the kernel patches and compiling the necessary programs (utils). But with SuSE (>7.2), kernel encryption is built in which has saved me a load of time compiling it into the kernel.
SuSE uses twofish as the encryption algorithm which is good enough for me. I would prefer to use serpent, but not enough to recompile everything. Both twofish and serpent were finalists in the U.S. Federal AES competition, both losing to rijndeal. Of course, W2K/XP use weak 56-bit DES in their EFS and have administrator back doors, so it barely qualifies as encryption.
If you want fast, reliable, and easy to use enrypted file systems, choose SuSE!
Re:I've used it the last 2 years (Score:3, Informative)
Microsoft is using 128-bit DESX encryption for EFS. What is DESX? It's a strengthened version of DES created by RSA Laboratories.
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/3-2-7.html
As far as the back doors are concerned. If it's your own machine you have nothing to worry about because only you would know the backdoor. However for a corporation the administrative back door is regarded as a must-have feature in case an employee is fired, dies, leaves the company, whatever.
Why are Linux users so bloody ignorant?
encrypted root + warning about crypto in linux 2.4 (Score:5, Insightful)
For the truly paranoid, or as used to be my case, for laptops that travel a lot and hence are very prone to theft, the cool thing to do is to encrypt your (almost) entire disk, with your root filesystem on an encrypted loopback device, and no swap at all (because swap can't efficiently be encrypted, and RAM is so cheap anyway nowadays). Of course you still need to keep a small unencrypted boot partition to host your kernel, and an initrd image. The initial ramdisk must have a script that will setup the loop device -- prompting you for your passphrase -- before proceeding with system boot.
For additional protection, you might be tempted to keep this boot partition on a business-card size CD-R, thus making sure that nobody can insert code to steal your passphrase, but if they have access to your system for long enough, they could install a hardware keylogger and you're screwed anyway ^_^... Still, might be worth it to put some tamper detection right after the root fs is mounted (i.e. an md5sum check of your entire boot partition)
In any case, I've used such a laptop on a day-to-day basis for over a year and it worked great -- but do expect a huge performance loss on disk access.
On a related note, there is a warning on http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/crypto/v2.4 /README.WARNING to the effect that encryption might be a bit broken in 2.4 kernels. I guess you better stick with 2.2 for now if you really need loopback crypto filesystems...
Re:encrypted root + warning about crypto in linux (Score:2)
SuSE Linux comes with an encrypted filesystem (Score:2, Informative)
The International Kernel Patch (Score:2, Interesting)
Something needs to be done about the block size problem - the solution from cryptoapi doesn't seem "the right way"
The best things about kerneli are the possibility to choose between different encryption algorithms and that it's not filesystem dependent. Though I miss the oppertunity to use the encryption algorithms in userspace programs. (Same thing about the digest algorithms, do thay have any function except for enlarging the kernel size?)
I'm currently testing a pam module that mounts kerneli encrypted home directories, release scheduled a few weeks into the future.
some possible solutions (Score:2, Informative)
cryptoloop (cryptoapi), loop-aes, cryptfs, bestcrypt, crypto-patch (up to ~2.4.12, you have to change the Makefile -> better use cvs-cryptoapi)
steg:
stegfs, vs3fs
network:
cfs, tcfs, sfs, vpn solutions
CryptAPI (Score:2)
I'm not following the lists at the moment, but I'd hazard a guess that cryptapi is the replacement for kerneli, which has been in a coma for ages.
Lame, Windows XP implementation (Score:4, Interesting)
Bzztt... wrong...
Turns out that NTFS cannot be used on removable disks, even though the NTFS semantics are better suited (think what happens when a disk is unmounted unexpectedly.
The main reason I use an encrypted disk is that I have a lot of client sensitive info on my machine, including high level strategic plans for a Nasdaq 100 company.
Encrypted disks should be used as a matter of course on machines used by lawyers, doctors, accountants, anyone with a professional confidentiality duty. Laptops get stolen, machines get sold with confidential information still on the drives.
I am more skeptical about the need for encrypting file systems for geeks, after all most sysops would do better to keep less secrets rather than more.
Re:Lame, Windows XP implementation (Score:2, Informative)
I use NTFS on my zip 100 disks all the time. Its not that it won't work on removable disks, its that they disable the use of NTFS on small disks (and i guess flash cards? never used them.). I have not formated one on WinXP yet, but I have on WinNT4 and Win2000.
Re:Lame, Windows XP implementation (Score:2)
Could be that the limit is 128 Mb, I tried with a 64Mb compact flash, that is the largest I have so far. A friend told me they had problems with a 128Mb in a Nicon Coolpix 900 (he could only see 80Mb) so I didn't get any larger ones.
The help file is less than helpfull
Re:Lame, Windows XP implementation (Score:2)
You'd be better off with PGP7 and it's PGPdisk utility. I use it all the time to move around an encrypted file system on an Iomega Zip disk. The down size is that you need to have PGP installed on every machine you intend to use, and a way to move your keyring around too.
Re:Lame, Windows XP implementation (Score:2)
No, not close.
And since the topic is encrypting file stores I don't think the issue is off-topic. The point is not that encrypting file stores are a bad idea. It is just that the typical uses of Linux don't have a great deal of overlap with the areas where you really need encrypting file stores.
twofish loopback encryption (Score:2, Informative)
This is quite different to quite a lot of other methods. It allows to backup encrypted files to e.g. CDROM and still have them mountable from there. Works quite well.
StegFS? (Score:2, Informative)
Fighting for Peace, is Like Fucking for Virginity
Use Loop AES (Score:2)
http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/
It works wonderfully, and has worked on every kernel I've tried it on. It doesn't patch the kernel and require a rebuild (except that it requires you do not use the kernel's standard loop device).
It requires a little bit of extra work in that you need to patch util-linux. I used to use cfsd, but I've not been able to get it to work on recent kernels, so I've moved my encrypted volumes to loopAES. I've had no problems at all with it.
Jason.
sleeping laptop defeats encryption (Score:2, Informative)
Unmount encrypted filesystems before you sleep the laptop and put a password on your screensaver in case you get lazy. (don't count on a password-protected screensaver to protect you though -- maybe someone will create a screensaver that unmounts any encrypted fs and prompts for the access password...
More cryptoapi links (Score:2)
when was the last windows EFS release? (Score:2)
by the way, when was the last vulnerability patch?
BestCrypt (Score:2)
James
I'm trying to do this (Score:2, Interesting)
I'm not a crypto whiz and am having serious trouble finding enough information about how filesystems work in order to implement all of the required interfaces. Does anybody know where this information is, or should I look through Linux/BSD sources - and hope that BSD is applicable to OS X?
My current version is pretty much a library that allows you to like apps against it, but doesn't support native operation. The next release will add networking support, but I really need to go native to make it useful to people.
Also, can anybody help decrease the usefulness of the algorithm for decryption so that I can GPL the thing? You can see what I've done from here. [unimelb.edu.au]
- Malcolm
Re:BestCrypt (Score:1)
Re:BestCrypt (Score:1)
Re:Here is how to do it (Score:4, Insightful)
sigh...
"its encrypted because we say it is, and trust us on that"
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Here is how to do it (Score:2)
Given the NSA's history with various companies (Crypto AG anyone?) and their encryption software, I think the opposite proof is required. All proprietary products must be assumed to have back doors unless they can somehow prove otherwise. BTW, good luck with that proof without releasing source code.
Also, Microsoft has a pretty bad history (their VPN software for example) of making things that really are secure in the cryptography arena. So again, I think the burden of proof is the other way.
All Microsoft software is only as secure as it absolutely has to be in order to sell it, and history (and knowing the average buyer) shows that's not very secure. Trusting Microsoft with security is like trusting an unregulated S&L with your money.
Re:Here is how to do it (Score:2)
http://www.safenetworks.com/Windows/syskey2.htm
Basically the way they "hacked" EFS was to reset the user password, and Microsoft already has a mechanism to prevent this, if needed.
Re:Here is how to do it (Score:2, Insightful)
Or get the source code for an existing cryptographic application and audit it. A good programmer and a good mathematician working together could probably produce a reasonably trustworthy audit of the cryptographic functions in a given application.
Of course, this requires that the source code be availble for inspection and that the code can be compiled for actual use in the production environment. It's pointless to audit source code that is then carried off and you are subsequently handed a binary-only application "supposedly" based on the audited code.
OpenBSD filesystem encryption (Score:4, Informative)
It has the code for it, but it isn't enabled by default.
Enabling swap encryption is easiest, you just modify you /etc/sysctl.conf (it's labelled well in that file) and/or use the sysctl command.
i use swap encryption on my 1.2 athlon, but not on my 486's running openbsd.
Enabling filesystem encryption requires a kernel build (you need to add "option TCFS" to your config) and some commands to be compiled and run. i found this article [demon.co.uk] to be helpful.
i just did this to see what it'd be like. the documentation is rather minimal but it is workable. You have the option of using 3DES, RC5 and Blowfish. Check out that link for more info.
Re:centric? lame (Score:2)