An anonymous reader quotes a report from TorrentFreak: A popular GitHub repo and over 120 forks containing Switch emulation tutorials have been targeted by Nintendo. While most forks are now disabled, the main repository has managed to survive after being given the opportunity to put things right. Whether Nintendo appreciated the irony is unclear, but it appears that use of encoding as a protection measure to obfuscate links, was no match for the video game company's circumvention skills. [...] The Switch Emulators Guide was presented in the context of piracy, something made clear by a note on the main page of the original repo which stated that the tutorial was made, in part, for use on the /r/NewYuzuPiracy subreddit. Since the actions of Yuzu and its eventual demise are part of the unwritten framework for similar takedowns, that sets the tone (although not the legal basis) in favor of takedown.

When asked to provide a description and URL pointing to the copyrighted content allegedly infringed by the repos, Nintendo states that the works are the 'Nintendo Switch firmware" and various games protected by technological protection measures (TPM) which prevent users from unlawfully copying and playing pirated games. The notice states the repos 'provide access' to keys that enable circumvention of its technical measures. "The reported repositories offer and provide access to unauthorized copies of cryptographic keys that are used to circumvent Nintendo's Technological Measures and infringe Nintendo's intellectual property rights. Specifically, the reported repositories provide to users unauthorized copies of cryptographic keys (prod.keys) extracted from the Nintendo Switch firmware," Nintendo writes.

"The prod.keys allow users to bypass Nintendo's Technological Measures for digital games; specifically, prod.keys allow users to decrypt and play Nintendo Switch games in unauthorized ways. Distribution of keys without the copyright owner's authorization is a violation of Section 1201 of the DMCA." Nintendo further notes that unauthorized distribution of prod.keys "facilitates copyright infringement by permitting users to play pirated versions of Nintendo's copyright-protected game software on systems without the Nintendo Technological Measures or systems on which Nintendo's Technological Measures have been disabled." Since the prod.keys are extracted from the Nintendo Switch firmware, which is also protected by copyright, distribution amounts to "infringement of Nintendo Switch firmware itself."

Given that the repo's stated purpose was to provide information on how to circumvent Nintendo's technical protection measures, it's fairly ironic that it appears to have used technical measures itself to hinder detection. "The reported repositories attempt to evade detection of their illegal activities by providing access to prod.keys and unauthorized copies of Nintendo's firmware and video games via encoded links that direct users to third-party websites to download the infringing content," Nintendo explains in its notice. "The repositories provide strings of letters and numbers and then instruct users to 'use [private] to decode the lines of strings given here to get an actual link.' The decoded links take users to sites where they can access the prod.keys and unauthorized copies of Nintendo's copyright-protected material." The image below shows the encoded links (partially redacted) that allegedly link to the content in question on third-party sites. To hide their nature, regular URLs are encoded using Base64, a binary-to-text encoding scheme that transforms them into a sequence of characters. Those characters can be decoded to reveal the original URL using online tools.

How will Apple protect user data while their requests are being processed by AI in applications like Siri?

Long-time Slashdot reader AmiMoJo shared this report from Apple Insider: According to sources of The Information [four different former Apple employees who worked on the project], Apple intends to process data from AI applications inside a virtual black box.

The concept, known as "Apple Chips in Data Centers" internally, would involve only Apple's hardware being used to perform AI processing in the cloud. The idea is that it will control both the hardware and software on its servers, enabling it to design more secure systems. While on-device AI processing is highly private, the initiative could make cloud processing for Apple customers to be similarly secure... By taking control over how data is processed in the cloud, it would make it easier for Apple to implement processes to make a breach much harder to actually happen.

Furthermore, the black box approach would also prevent Apple itself from being able to see the data. As a byproduct, this means it would also be difficult for Apple to hand over any personal data from government or law enforcement data requests.
Processed data from the servers would be stored in Apple's "Secure Enclave" (where the iPhone stores biometric data, encryption keys and passwords), according to the article.

"Doing so means the data can't be seen by other elements of the system, nor Apple itself."

An anonymous reader quotes an op-ed from The Globe and Mail, written by Kate Robertson and Ron Deibert. Robertson is a senior research associate and Deibert is director at the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab. From the piece: A federal cybersecurity bill, slated to advance through Parliament soon, contains secretive, encryption-breaking powers that the government has been loath to talk about. And they threaten the online security of everyone in Canada. Bill C-26 empowers government officials to secretly order telecommunications companies to install backdoors inside encrypted elements in Canada's networks. This could include requiring telcos to alter the 5G encryption standards that protect mobile communications to facilitate government surveillance. The government's decision to push the proposed law forward without amending it to remove this encryption-breaking capability has set off alarm bells that these new powers are a feature, not a bug.

There are already many insecurities in today's networks, reaching down to the infrastructure layers of communication technology. The Signalling System No. 7, developed in 1975 to route phone calls, has become a major source of insecurity for cellphones. In 2017, the CBC demonstrated how hackers only needed a Canadian MP's cell number to intercept his movements, text messages and phone calls. Little has changed since: A 2023 Citizen Lab report details pervasive vulnerabilities at the heart of the world's mobile networks. So it makes no sense that the Canadian government would itself seek the ability to create more holes, rather than patching them. Yet it is pushing for potential new powers that would infect next-generation cybersecurity tools with old diseases.

It's not as if the government wasn't warned. Citizen Lab researchers presented the 2023 report's findings in parliamentary hearings on Bill C-26, and leaders and experts in civil society and in Canada's telecommunications industry warned that the bill must be narrowed to prevent its broad powers to compel technical changes from being used to compromise the "confidentiality, integrity, or availability" of telecommunication services. And yet, while government MPs maintained that their intent is not to expand surveillance capabilities, MPs pushed the bill out of committee without this critical amendment last month. In doing so, the government has set itself up to be the sole arbiter of when, and on what conditions, Canadians deserve security for their most confidential communications -- personal, business, religious, or otherwise. The new powers would only make people in Canada more vulnerable to malicious threats to the privacy and security of all network users, including Canada's most senior officials. [...] "Now, more than ever, there is no such thing as a safe backdoor," the authors write in closing. "A shortcut that provides a narrow advantage for the few at the expense of us all is no way to secure our complex digital ecosystem."

"Against this threat landscape, a pivot is crucial. Canada needs cybersecurity laws that explicitly recognize that uncompromised encryption is the backbone of cybersecurity, and it must be mandated and protected by all means possible."

Messaging app Signal's president Meredith Whittaker criticized rival Telegram's security on Friday, saying Telegram founder Pavel Durov is "full of s---" in his claims about Signal. "Telegram is a social media platform, it's not encrypted, it's the least secure of messaging and social media services out there," Whittaker told TechCrunch in an interview. The comments come amid a war of words between Whittaker, Durov and Twitter owner Elon Musk over the security of their respective platforms. Whittaker said Durov's amplification of claims questioning Signal's security was "incredibly reckless" and "actually harms real people."

"Play your games, but don't take them into my court," Whittaker said, accusing Durov of prioritizing being "followed by a professional photographer" over getting facts right about Signal's encryption. Signal uses end-to-end encryption by default, while Telegram only offers it for "secret chats." Whittaker said many in Ukraine and Russia use Signal for "actual serious communications" while relying on Telegram's less-secure social media features. She said the "jury is in" on the platforms' comparative security and that Signal's open source code allows experts to validate its privacy claims, which have the trust of the security community.

WhatsApp's security team warned that despite the app's encryption, users are vulnerable to government surveillance through traffic analysis, according to an internal threat assessment obtained by The Intercept. The document suggests that governments can monitor when and where encrypted communications occur, potentially allowing powerful inferences about who is conversing with whom. The report adds: Even though the contents of WhatsApp communications are unreadable, the assessment shows how governments can use their access to internet infrastructure to monitor when and where encrypted communications are occurring, like observing a mail carrier ferrying a sealed envelope. This view into national internet traffic is enough to make powerful inferences about which individuals are conversing with each other, even if the subjects of their conversations remain a mystery. "Even assuming WhatsApp's encryption is unbreakable," the assessment reads, "ongoing 'collect and correlate' attacks would still break our intended privacy model."

The WhatsApp threat assessment does not describe specific instances in which it knows this method has been deployed by state actors. But it cites extensive reporting by the New York Times and Amnesty International showing how countries around the world spy on dissident encrypted chat app usage, including WhatsApp, using the very same techniques. As war has grown increasingly computerized, metadata -- information about the who, when, and where of conversations -- has come to hold immense value to intelligence, military, and police agencies around the world. "We kill people based on metadata," former National Security Agency chief Michael Hayden once infamously quipped. Meta said "WhatsApp has no backdoors and we have no evidence of vulnerabilities in how WhatsApp works." Though the assessment describes the "vulnerabilities" as "ongoing," and specifically mentions WhatsApp 17 times, a Meta spokesperson said the document is "not a reflection of a vulnerability in WhatsApp," only "theoretical," and not unique to WhatsApp.

Companies working with the US government may be required to start protecting their data and technology from attacks by quantum computers as soon as July. From a report: The National Institute for Standards and Technology, part of the Department of Commerce, will in July stipulate three types of encryption algorithms the agency deems sufficient for protecting data from quantum computers, setting an internationally-recognized standard aimed at helping organizations manage evolving cybersecurity threats. The rollout of the standards will kick off "the transition to the next generation of cryptography," White House deputy national security adviser Anne Neuberger told Bloomberg in Cambridge, England on Tuesday. Breaking encryption not only threatens "national security secrets" but also the the way we secure the internet, online payments and bank transactions, she added.

Neuberger was speaking at an event organized by the University of Cambridge and Vanderbilt University, hosting academics, industry professionals and government officials to discuss the threats posed to cybersecurity by quantum computing, which vastly accelerates processing power by performing calculations in parallel rather than sequentially and will make existing encryption systems obsolete.

LastPass, the password manager company, has officially separated from its parent company, GoTo, following a series of high-profile hacks in recent years. The company will now operate under a shareholder holding company called LMI Parent.

LastPass -- owned by private equity firms Francisco Partners and Elliott Management -- has faced criticism for its handling of the breaches, which resulted in the theft of customer data and encryption keys. The company has since enforced a 12-character minimum for master passwords to improve security.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from MIT Technology Review: Almost all keyboard apps used by Chinese people around the world share a security loophole that makes it possible to spy on what users are typing. The vulnerability, which allows the keystroke data that these apps send to the cloud to be intercepted, has existed for years and could have been exploited by cybercriminals and state surveillance groups, according to researchers at the Citizen Lab, a technology and security research lab affiliated with the University of Toronto.

These apps help users type Chinese characters more efficiently and are ubiquitous on devices used by Chinese people. The four most popular apps -- built by major internet companies like Baidu, Tencent, and iFlytek -- basically account for all the typing methods that Chinese people use. Researchers also looked into the keyboard apps that come preinstalled on Android phones sold in China. What they discovered was shocking. Almost every third-party app and every Android phone with preinstalled keyboards failed to protect users by properly encrypting the content they typed. A smartphone made by Huawei was the only device where no such security vulnerability was found.

In August 2023, the same researchers found that Sogou, one of the most popular keyboard apps, did not use Transport Layer Security (TLS) when transmitting keystroke data to its cloud server for better typing predictions. Without TLS, a widely adopted international cryptographic protocol that protects users from a known encryption loophole, keystrokes can be collected and then decrypted by third parties. Even though Sogou fixed the issue after it was made public last year, some Sogou keyboards preinstalled on phones are not updated to the latest version, so they are still subject to eavesdropping. [...] After the researchers got in contact with companies that developed these keyboard apps, the majority of the loopholes were fixed. But a few companies have been unresponsive, and the vulnerability still exists in some apps and phones, including QQ Pinyin and Baidu, as well as in any keyboard app that hasn't been updated to the latest version.

Yet another international cop shop has come out swinging against end-to-end encryption - this time it's Europol which is urging an end to implementation of the tech for fear police investigations will be hampered by protected DMs. The Register: In a joint declaration of European police chiefs published over the weekend, Europol said it needs lawful access to private messages, and said tech companies need to be able to scan them (ostensibly impossible with E2EE implemented) to protect users. Without such access, cops fear they won't be able to prevent "the most heinous of crimes" like terrorism, human trafficking, child sexual abuse material (CSAM), murder, drug smuggling and other crimes.

"Our societies have not previously tolerated spaces that are beyond the reach of law enforcement, where criminals can communicate safely and child abuse can flourish," the declaration said. "They should not now." The joint statement, which was agreed to in cooperation with the UK's National Crime Agency, isn't exactly making a novel claim. It's nearly the same line of reasoning that the Virtual Global Taskforce, an international law enforcement group founded in 2003 to combat CSAM online, made last year when Meta first first started talking about implementing E2EE on Messenger and Instagram.

This week the new "Find My Device" feature rolled out to Android devices around the world, starting in the U.S. and Canada.

"With a new, crowdsourced network of over a billion Android devices, Find My Device can help you find your misplaced Android devices and everyday items quickly and securely," according to a Google blog post. ZDNet explains: Although Google already offers a Find My Device setting on Android phones, the device you're looking for must be powered on and connected for the feature to work. The new Find My Device network is designed to use Bluetooth to track down missing phones and other devices that are disconnected from a Wi-Fi or cellular network. A Powered Off Finding feature would let each device store beacons in its Bluetooth controller's memory, letting the network see any supported device even if it's not connected.
From Google's blog post: Locate your compatible Android phone and tablet by ringing them or viewing their location on a map in the app — even when they're offline. And thanks to specialized Pixel hardware, Pixel 8 and 8 Pro owners will also be able to find their devices if they're powered off or the battery is dead.

Starting in May, you'll be able to locate everyday items like your keys, wallet or luggage with Bluetooth tracker tags from Chipolo and Pebblebee in the Find My Device app.
Google promises "end-to-end encryption of location data as well as aggregated device location reporting, a first-of-its-kind safety feature that provides additional protection against unwanted tracking back to a home or private location." Find My Device is available on compatible devices running Android 9 or higher.

In addition, "Sometimes what we're looking for is right under our noses. If you're close to your lost device but need a little extra help tracking it down, a 'Find nearby' button will appear to help you figure out exactly where it's hiding. You'll also be able to use this to find everyday items, like your wallet or keys, when Bluetooth tags launch in May.

"More often than not, we lose everyday items like our keys or phone right at home. So the Find My Device app now shows a lost device's proximity to your home Nest devices, giving you an easy reference point."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from KrebsOnSecurity: The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) said today it is investigating a breach at business intelligence company Sisense, whose products are designed to allow companies to view the status of multiple third-party online services in a single dashboard. CISA urged all Sisense customers to reset any credentials and secrets that may have been shared with the company, which is the same advice Sisense gave to its customers Wednesday evening. New York City based Sisense has more than 1,000 customers across a range of industry verticals, including financial services, telecommunications, healthcare and higher education. On April 10, Sisense Chief Information Security Officer Sangram Dash told customers the company had been made aware of reports that "certain Sisense company information may have been made available on what we have been advised is a restricted access server (not generally available on the internet.)" In its alert, CISA said it was working with private industry partners to respond to a recent compromise discovered by independent security researchers involving Sisense.

Sisense declined to comment when asked about the veracity of information shared by two trusted sources with close knowledge of the breach investigation. Those sources said the breach appears to have started when the attackers somehow gained access to the company's code repository at Gitlab, and that in that repository was a token or credential that gave the bad guys access to Sisense's Amazon S3 buckets in the cloud. Both sources said the attackers used the S3 access to copy and exfiltrate several terabytes worth of Sisense customer data, which apparently included millions of access tokens, email account passwords, and even SSL certificates.

The incident raises questions about whether Sisense was doing enough to protect sensitive data entrusted to it by customers, such as whether the massive volume of stolen customer data was ever encrypted while at rest in these Amazon cloud servers. It is clear, however, that unknown attackers now have all of the credentials that Sisense customers used in their dashboards. The breach also makes clear that Sisense is somewhat limited in the clean-up actions that it can take on behalf of customers, because access tokens are essentially text files on your computer that allow you to stay logged in for extended periods of time -- sometimes indefinitely. And depending on which service we're talking about, it may be possible for attackers to re-use those access tokens to authenticate as the victim without ever having to present valid credentials. Beyond that, it is largely up to Sisense customers to decide if and when they change passwords to the various third-party services that they've previously entrusted to Sisense. "If they are hosting customer data on a third-party system like Amazon, it better damn well be encrypted," said Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at University of California, Berkeley's International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) and lecturer at UC Davis. "If they are telling people to rest credentials, that means it was not encrypted. So mistake number one is leaving Amazon credentials in your Git archive. Mistake number two is using S3 without using encryption on top of it. The former is bad but forgivable, but the latter given their business is unforgivable."

TechCrunch reports this week that Meta "is denying that it gave Netflix access to users' private messages..." The claim references a court filing that emerged as part of the discovery process in a class-action lawsuit over data privacy practices between a group of consumers and Facebook's parent, Meta. The document alleges that Netflix and Facebook had a "special relationship" and that Facebook even cut spending on original programming for its Facebook Watch video service so as not to compete with Netflix, a large Facebook advertiser. It also says that Netflix had access to Meta's "Inbox API" that offered the streamer "programmatic access to Facebook's user's private message inboxes...."

Meta's communications director, Andy Stone, reposted the original X post on Tuesday with a statement disputing that Netflix had been given access to users' private messages. "Shockingly untrue," Stone wrote on X. "Meta didn't share people's private messages with Netflix. The agreement allowed people to message their friends on Facebook about what they were watching on Netflix, directly from the Netflix app. Such agreements are commonplace in the industry...."

Beyond Stone's X post, Meta has not provided further comment. However, The New York Times had previously reported in 2018 that Netflix and Spotify could read users' private messages, according to documents it had obtained. Meta denied those claims at the time via a blog post titled "Facts About Facebook's Messaging Partnerships," where it explained that Netflix and Spotify had access to APIs that allowed consumers to message friends about what they were listening to on Spotify or watching on Netflix directly from those companies' respective apps. This required the companies to have "write access" to compose messages to friends, "read access" to allow users to read messages back from friends, and "delete access," which meant if you deleted a message from the third-party app, it would also delete the message from Facebook.

"No third party was reading your private messages, or writing messages to your friends without your permission. Many news stories imply we were shipping over private messages to partners, which is not correct," the blog post stated. In any event, Messenger didn't implement default end-to-end encryption until December 2023, a practice that would have made these sorts of claims a non-starter, as it wouldn't have left room for doubt.

"After being in development since 2019, the huge NetBSD 10.0 is out today as a wonderful Easter surprise," reports Phoronix: NetBSD 10 provides WireGuard support, support for many newer Arm platforms including for Apple Silicon and newer Raspberry Pi boards, a new Intel Ethernet drive, support for Realtek 2.5GbE network adapters, SMP performance improvements, automatic swap encryption, and an enormous amount of other hardware support improvements that accumulated over the past 4+ years.

Plus there is no shortage of bug fixes and performance optimizations with NetBSD 10. Some tests of NetBSD 10.0 in development back during 2020 showed at that point it was already 12% faster than NetBSD 9.
"A lot of development went into this new release," NetBSD wrote on their blog, saying "This also caused the release announcement to be one of the longest we ever did."

Among the new userspace programs is warp(6), which they describe as a "classic BSD space war game (copyright donated to the NetBSD Foundation by Larry Wall)."

"There is a new side channel attack against Apple 'M' series CPUs that does not appear to be fixable without a major performance hit," writes Slashdot reader EncryptedSoldier. SecurityWeek reports: A team of researchers representing several universities in the United States has disclosed the details of a new side-channel attack method that can be used to extract secret encryption keys from systems powered by Apple CPUs. The attack method, dubbed GoFetch, has been described as a microarchitectural side-channel attack that allows the extraction of secret keys from constant-time cryptographic implementations. These types of attacks require local access to the targeted system. The attack targets a hardware optimization named data memory-dependent prefetcher (DMP), which attempts to prefetch addresses found in the contents of program memory to improve performance.

The researchers have found a way to use specially crafted cryptographic operation inputs that allow them to infer secret keys, guessing them bits at a time by monitoring the behavior of the DMP. They managed to demonstrate end-to-end key extraction attacks against several crypto implementations, including OpenSSL Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, Go RSA, and the post-quantum CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium. The researchers have conducted successful GoFetch attacks against systems powered by Apple M1 processors, and they have found evidence that the attack could also work against M2 and M3 processors. They have also tested an Intel processor that uses DMP, but found that it's 'more robust' against such attacks.

The experts said Apple is investigating the issue, but fully addressing it does not seem trivial. The researchers have proposed several countermeasures, but they involve hardware changes that are not easy to implement or mitigations that can have a significant impact on performance. Apple told SecurityWeek that it thanks the researchers for their collaboration as this work advances the company's understanding of these types of threats. The tech giant also shared a link to a developer page that outlines one of the mitigations mentioned by the researchers. The researchers have published a paper (PDF) detailing their work.

Ars Technica's Dan Goodin also reported on the vulnerability.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Wired: When thousands of security researchers descend on Las Vegas every August for what's come to be known as "hacker summer camp," the back-to-back Black Hat and Defcon hacker conferences, it's a given that some of them will experiment with hacking the infrastructure of Vegas itself, the city's elaborate array of casino and hospitality technology. But at one private event in 2022, a select group of researchers were actually invited to hack a Vegas hotel room, competing in a suite crowded with their laptops and cans of Red Bull to find digital vulnerabilities in every one of the room's gadgets, from its TV to its bedside VoIP phone. One team of hackers spent those days focused on the lock on the room's door, perhaps its most sensitive piece of technology of all. Now, more than a year and a half later, they're finally bringing to light the results of that work: a technique they discovered that would allow an intruder to open any of millions of hotel rooms worldwide in seconds, with just two taps.

Today, Ian Carroll, Lennert Wouters, and a team of other security researchers are revealing a hotel keycard hacking technique they call Unsaflok. The technique is a collection of security vulnerabilities that would allow a hacker to almost instantly open several models of Saflok-brand RFID-based keycard locks sold by the Swiss lock maker Dormakaba. The Saflok systems are installed on 3 million doors worldwide, inside 13,000 properties in 131 countries. By exploiting weaknesses in both Dormakaba's encryption and the underlying RFID system Dormakaba uses, known as MIFARE Classic, Carroll and Wouters have demonstrated just how easily they can open a Saflok keycard lock. Their technique starts with obtaining any keycard from a target hotel -- say, by booking a room there or grabbing a keycard out of a box of used ones -- then reading a certain code from that card with a $300 RFID read-write device, and finally writing two keycards of their own. When they merely tap those two cards on a lock, the first rewrites a certain piece of the lock's data, and the second opens it.

Dormakaba says that it's been working since early last year to make hotels that use Saflok aware of their security flaws and to help them fix or replace the vulnerable locks. For many of the Saflok systems sold in the last eight years, there's no hardware replacement necessary for each individual lock. Instead, hotels will only need to update or replace the front desk management system and have a technician carry out a relatively quick reprogramming of each lock, door by door. Wouters and Carroll say they were nonetheless told by Dormakaba that, as of this month, only 36 percent of installed Safloks have been updated. Given that the locks aren't connected to the internet and some older locks will still need a hardware upgrade, they say the full fix will still likely take months longer to roll out, at the very least. Some older installations may take years.

A newly discovered vulnerability baked into Apple's M-series of chips allows attackers to extract secret keys from Macs when they perform widely used cryptographic operations, academic researchers have revealed in a paper published Thursday. From a report: The flaw -- a side channel allowing end-to-end key extractions when Apple chips run implementations of widely used cryptographic protocols -- can't be patched directly because it stems from the microarchitectural design of the silicon itself. Instead, it can only be mitigated by building defenses into third-party cryptographic software that could drastically degrade M-series performance when executing cryptographic operations, particularly on the earlier M1 and M2 generations. The vulnerability can be exploited when the targeted cryptographic operation and the malicious application with normal user system privileges run on the same CPU cluster.

The threat resides in the chips' data memory-dependent prefetcher, a hardware optimization that predicts the memory addresses of data that running code is likely to access in the near future. By loading the contents into the CPU cache before it's actually needed, the DMP, as the feature is abbreviated, reduces latency between the main memory and the CPU, a common bottleneck in modern computing. DMPs are a relatively new phenomenon found only in M-series chips and Intel's 13th-generation Raptor Lake microarchitecture, although older forms of prefetchers have been common for years. Security experts have long known that classical prefetchers open a side channel that malicious processes can probe to obtain secret key material from cryptographic operations. This vulnerability is the result of the prefetchers making predictions based on previous access patterns, which can create changes in state that attackers can exploit to leak information. In response, cryptographic engineers have devised constant-time programming, an approach that ensures that all operations take the same amount of time to complete, regardless of their operands. It does this by keeping code free of secret-dependent memory accesses or structures.

Longtime Slashdot reader SonicSpike shares a report from The Intercept: With the new version of Signal, you will no longer broadcast your phone number to everyone you send messages to by default, though you can choose to if you want. Your phone number will still be displayed to contacts who already have it stored in their phones. Going forward, however, when you start a new conversation on Signal, your number won't be shared at all: Contacts will just see the name you use when you set up your Signal profile. So even if your contact is using a custom Signal client, for example, they still won't be able to discover your phone number since the service will never tell it to them.

You also now have the option to set a username, which Signal lets you change whenever you want and delete when you don't want it anymore. Rather than directly storing your username as part of your account details, Signal stores a cryptographic hash of your username instead; Signal uses the Ristretto 25519 hashing algorithm, essentially storing a random block of data instead of usernames themselves. This is like how online services can confirm a user's password is valid without storing a copy of the actual password itself. "As far as we're aware, we're the only messaging platform that now has support for usernames that doesn't know everyone's usernames by default," said Josh Lund, a senior technologist at Signal. The move is yet another piece of the Signal ethos to keep as little data on hand as it can, lest the authorities try to intrude on the company. Whittaker explained, "We don't want to be forced to enumerate a directory of usernames." [...]

If Signal receives a subpoena demanding that they hand over all account data related to a user with a specific username that is currently active at the time that Signal looks it up, they would be able to link it to an account. That means Signal would turn over that user's phone number, along with the account creation date and the last connection date. Whittaker stressed that this is "a pretty narrow pipeline that is guarded viciously by ACLU lawyers," just to obtain a phone number based on a username. Signal, though, can't confirm how long a given username has been in use, how many other accounts have used it in the past, or anything else about it. If the Signal user briefly used a username and then deleted it, Signal wouldn't even be able to confirm that it was ever in use to begin with, much less which accounts had used it before.

In short, if you're worried about Signal handing over your phone number to law enforcement based on your username, you should only set a username when you want someone to contact you, and then delete it afterward. And each time, always set a different username. Likewise, if you want someone to contact you securely, you can send them your Signal link, and, as soon as they make contact, you can reset the link. If Signal receives a subpoena based on a link that was already reset, it will be impossible for them to look up which account it was associated with. If the subpoena demands that Signal turn over account information based on a phone number, rather than a username, Signal could be forced to hand over the cryptographic hash of the account's username, if a username is set. It would be difficult, however, for law enforcement to learn the actual username itself based on its hash. If they already suspect a username, they could use the hash to confirm that it's real. Otherwise, they would have to guess the username using password cracking techniques like dictionary attacks or rainbow tables.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Liliputing: Yuzu is a free and open source emulator that makes it possible to run Nintendo Switch games on Windows, Linux, and Android devices. First released in 2018, the software has been under constant development since then (the Android port was released less than a year ago). But last week Nintendo sued the developers, claiming that the primary purpose of the software is to circumvent Nintendo Switch encryption and allow users to play pirated games. Rather than fight the case in court, Tropic Haze (the developers behind Yuzu) have agreed to a settlement which involves paying $2.4 million in damages to Nintendo and basically shutting down Yuzu.

As part of a permanent injunction, Tropic Haze has agreed to stop distributing, advertising, or promoting Yuzu or any of its source code or features or any other "software or devices that circumvent Nintendo's technical protection measures." The court is also ordering the developers to turn over the yuzu-emu.org website to Nintendo and bars them "from supporting or facilitating access" to any other related websites, social media, chatrooms, or apps. In one of the more bizarre parts of the court order, the Yuzu team is told to delete all "circumvention devices," which includes any tools used for development of Yuzu and "all copies of Yuzu."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Video doorbell cameras have been commoditized to the point where they're available for $30-$40 on marketplaces like Amazon, Walmart, Temu, and Shein. The true cost of owning one might be much greater, however. Consumer Reports (CR) has released the findings of a security investigation into two budget-minded doorbell brands, Eken and Tuck, which are largely the same hardware produced by the Eken Group in China, according to CR. The cameras are further resold under at least 10 more brands. The cameras are set up through a common mobile app, Aiwit. And the cameras share something else, CR claims: "troubling security vulnerabilities."

Among the camera's vulnerabilities cited by CR:
- Sending public IP addresses and Wi-Fi SSIDs (names) over the Internet without encryption
- Takeover of the cameras by putting them into pairing mode (which you can do from a front-facing button on some models) and connecting through the Aiwit app
- Access to still images from the video feed and other information by knowing the camera's serial number.

CR also noted that Eken cameras lacked an FCC registration code. More than 4,200 were sold in January 2024, according to CR, and often held an Amazon "Overall Pick" label (as one model did when an Ars writer looked on Wednesday). CR issued vulnerability disclosures to Eken and Tuck regarding its findings. The disclosures note the amount of data that is sent over the network without authentication, including JPEG files, the local SSID, and external IP address. It notes that after a malicious user has re-paired a doorbell with a QR code generated by the Aiwit app, they have complete control over the device until a user sees an email from Eken and reclaims the doorbell. "These video doorbells from little known manufacturers have serious security and privacy vulnerabilities, and now they've found their way onto major digital marketplaces such as Amazon and Walmart," said Justin Brookman, director of tech policy at Consumer Reports, in a statement. "Both the manufacturers and platforms that sell the doorbells have a responsibility to ensure that these products are not putting consumers in harm's way."

Nintendo has filed a 41-page lawsuit against the makers of Yuzu, an open-source Nintendo Switch emulator, accusing them of "facilitating piracy at a colossal scale." Polygon reports: Yuzu is a free emulator that was released in 2018 months after the Nintendo Switch originally launched. The same folks who made Citra, a Nintendo 3DS emulator, made this one. Basically, it's a piece of software that lets people play Nintendo Switch games on Windows PC, Linux, and Android devices. (It also runs on Steam Deck, which Valve showed -- then wiped -- in a Steam Deck video clip.) Emulators aren't necessarily illegal, but pirating games to play on them is. But Nintendo said in its lawsuit that there's no way to legal way to use Yuzu.

Nintendo argued that Yuzu executes codes that "defeat" Nintendo's security measures, including decryption using "an illegally-obtained copy of prod.keys." "In other words, without Yuzu's decryption of Nintendo's encryption, unauthorized copies of games could not be played on PCs or Android devices," Nintendo wrote in the lawsuit. As to the alleged damages created by Yuzu, Nintendo pointed to the release of The Legend of Zelda: Tears of the Kingdom. Tears of the Kingdom leaked almost two weeks earlier than the game's May 12 release date. The pirated version of the game spread quickly; Nintendo said it was downloaded more than 1 million times before Tears of the Kingdom's release date. People used Yuzu to play the game; Nintendo said more than 20% of download links pointed people to Yuzu.

Though Yuzu doesn't give out pirated copies of games, Nintendo repeatedly said that most ROM sites point people toward Yuzu to play whatever games they've downloaded. Nintendo said its "expended significant resources to stop the illegal copying, marketing, sale, and distribution" of its Nintendo Switch games. It says that Yuzu earns the team $30,000 per month on its Patreon from more than 7,000 patrons. Nintendo said the company has earned at least $50,000 in paid Yuzu downloads. Nintendo said that Yuzu's Patreon doubled its paid members in the period between May 1 and May 12, when Tears of the Kingdom was released. Nintendo is asking the court to shut down the emulator, and for damages.