Encryption

Chinese Scientists Report Using Quantum Computer To Hack Military-grade Encryption (thequantuminsider.com) 52

UPDATE: Forbes writes that China hasn't broken military encryption. While factoring a 50-bit integer is an impressive technical achievement, it's important to note that RSA encryption commonly uses key sizes of 2048 bits or higher. The difficulty of factoring increases exponentially with the size of the number, meaning that the gap between 50-bit and 2048-bit integers is astronomically large...

The advances do not equate to a scalable method for breaking RSA encryption as it is used in practical applications today."

Long-time Slashdot schwit1 originally wrote: Chinese scientists have mounted what they say is the world's first effective attack on a widely used encryption method using a quantum computer. The breakthrough poses a "real and substantial threat" to the long-standing password-protection mechanism employed across critical sectors, including banking and the military, according to the researchers.

Despite the slow progress in general-purpose quantum computing, which currently poses no threat to modern cryptography, scientists have been exploring various attack approaches on specialised quantum computers. In the latest work led by Wang Chao, of Shanghai University, the team said it used a quantum computer produced by Canada's D-Wave Systems to successfully breach cryptographic algorithms.

Using the D-Wave Advantage, they successfully attacked the Present, Gift-64 and Rectangle algorithms -- all representative of the SPN (Substitution-Permutation Network) structure, which forms part of the foundation for advanced encryption standard (AES) widely used in the military and finance. AES-256, for instance, is considered the best encryption available and often referred to as military-grade encryption. While the exact passcode is not immediately available yet, it is closer than ever before, according to the study. "This is the first time that a real quantum computer has posed a real and substantial threat to multiple full-scale SPN structured algorithms in use today," they said in the peer-reviewed paper.

Security

European Govt Air-Gapped Systems Breached Using Custom Malware (bleepingcomputer.com) 51

An APT hacking group known as GoldenJackal has successfully breached air-gapped government systems in Europe using two custom toolsets to steal sensitive data, like emails, encryption keys, images, archives, and documents. From a report: According to an ESET report, this happened at least two times, one against the embassy of a South Asian country in Belarus in September 2019 and again in July 2021, and another against a European government organization between May 2022 and March 2024. In May 2023, Kaspersky warned about GoldenJackal's activities, noting that the threat actors focus on government and diplomatic entities for purposes of espionage. Although their use of custom tools spread over USB pen drives, like the 'JackalWorm,' was known, cases of a successful compromise of air-gapped systems were not previously confirmed.
Iphone

Chinese Hack of US ISPs Show Why Apple Is Right About Backdoors (9to5mac.com) 119

Alypius shares a report from 9to5Mac: It was revealed this weekend that Chinese hackers managed to access systems run by three of the largest internet service providers (ISPs) in the US. What's notable about the attack is that it compromised security backdoors deliberately created to allow for wiretaps by US law enforcement. [...] Apple famously refused the FBI's request to create a backdoor into iPhones to help access devices used by shooters in San Bernardino and Pensacola. The FBI was subsequently successful in accessing all the iPhones concerned without the assistance it sought.

Our arguments against such backdoors predate both cases, when Apple spoke out on the issue in the wake of terrorist attacks in Paris more than a decade ago: "Apple is absolutely right to say that the moment you build in a backdoor for use by governments, it will only be a matter of time before hackers figure it out. You cannot have an encryption system which is only a little bit insecure any more than you can be a little bit pregnant. Encryption systems are either secure or they're not -- and if they're not then it's a question of when, rather than if, others are able to exploit the vulnerability."

This latest case perfectly illustrates the point. The law required ISPs to create backdoors that could be used for wiretaps by US law enforcement, and hackers have now found and accessed them. Exactly the same would be true if Apple created backdoors into iPhones.

The Military

How Mossad Planned Its Exploding Pager Operation: Inside Israel's Penetration of Hezbollah (msn.com) 402

The Washington Post interviewed Lebanese officials, people close to Hezbollah, and Israeli, Arab and U.S. security officials and politicians about a years-long plan (originated at Mossad headquarters) that ultimately killed or maimed "as many as 3,000 Hezbollah officers and members — most of them rear-echelon figures... along with an unknown number of civilians... when Israel's Mossad intelligence service triggered the devices remotely on September 17." In the initial sales pitch to Hezbollah two years ago, the new line of Apollo pagers seemed precisely suited to the needs of a militia group with a sprawling network of fighters and a hard-earned reputation for paranoia... Best of all, there was no risk that the pagers could ever be tracked by Israel's intelligence services. Hezbollah's leaders were so impressed they bought 5,000 of them and began handing them out to mid-level fighters and support personnel in February. None of the users suspected they were wearing an ingeniously crafted Israeli bomb...

Israeli officials had watched with increasing anxiety as the Lebanese group added new weapons to an arsenal already capable of striking Israeli cities with tens of thousands of precision-guided missiles. Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service responsible for combating foreign threats to the Jewish state, had worked for years to penetrate the group with electronic monitoring and human informants. Over time, Hezbollah leaders learned to worry about the group's vulnerability to Israeli surveillance and hacking, fearing that even ordinary cellphones could be turned into Israeli-controlled eavesdropping and tracking devices. Thus was born the idea of creating a kind of communications Trojan horse, the officials said. Hezbollah was looking for hack-proof electronic networks for relaying messages, and Mossad came up with a pair of ruses that would lead the militia group to purchase devices that seemed perfect for the job — equipment that Mossad designed and had assembled in Israel.

The first part of the plan, booby-trapped walkie-talkies, began being inserted into Lebanon by Mossad nearly a decade ago, in 2015. The mobile two-way radios contained oversized battery packs, a hidden explosive and a transmission system that gave Israel complete access to Hezbollah communications. For nine years, the Israelis contented themselves with eavesdropping on Hezbollah, the officials said, while reserving the option to turn the walkie-talkies into bombs in a future crisis. But then came a new opportunity and a glitzy new product: a small pager equipped with a powerful explosive. In an irony that would not become clear for many months, Hezbollah would end up indirectly paying the Israelis for the tiny bombs that would kill or wound many of its operatives.

Because Hezbollah leaders were alert to possible sabotage, the pagers could not originate in Israel, the United States or any other Israeli ally. So, in 2023, the group began receiving solicitations for the bulk purchase of Taiwanese-branded Apollo pagers, a well-recognized trademark and product line with a worldwide distribution and no discernible links to Israeli or Jewish interests. The Taiwanese company had no knowledge of the plan, officials said... The marketing official had no knowledge of the operation and was unaware that the pagers were physically assembled in Israel under Mossad oversight, officials said... In a feat of engineering, the bomb component was so carefully hidden as to be virtually undetectable, even if the device was taken apart, the officials said. Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah did disassemble some of the pagers and may have even X-rayed them.

"Thousands of Apollo-branded pagers rang or vibrated at once, all across Lebanon and Syria," according to the article, with a short sentence in Arabic that said "You received an encrypted message." The two-button de-encryption procedure "ensured most users would be holding the pager with both hands when it detonated," according to the article, although "Less than a minute later, thousands of other pagers exploded by remote command, regardless of whether the user ever touched his device. The following day, on September 18, hundreds of walkie-talkies blew up in the same way, killing and maiming users and bystanders..."

"As Hezbollah reeled, Israel struck again, pounding the group's headquarters, arsenals and logistic centers with 2,000-pound bombs," the article concludes. And the strike "convinced the country's political leaders that Hezbollah could be put on the ropes, susceptible to a systematic dismantling using airstrikes and, eventually a ground invasion..."
Iphone

The Feds Still Can't Get Into Eric Adams' Phone (theverge.com) 112

The Verge's Gaby Del Valle reports: New York City Mayor Eric Adams, who was indicted last week on charges including fraud, bribery, and soliciting donations from foreign nationals, told federal investigators he forgot his phone password before handing it over, according to charging documents. That was almost a year ago, and investigators still can't get into the phone, prosecutors said Wednesday.

During a federal court hearing, prosecutor Hagan Scotten said the FBI's inability to get into Adams' phone is a "significant wild card," according to a report from the New York Post. The FBI issued a search warrant for Adams' devices in November 2023. Adams initially handed over two phones but didn't have his personal device on him. The indictment does not mention what type of device Adams uses. When Adams turned in his personal cellphone the following day, charging documents say, he said he had changed the password a day prior -- after learning about the investigation -- and couldn't remember it. Adams told investigators he changed the password "to prevent members of his staff from inadvertently or intentionally deleting the contents of his phone," the indictment alleges.
The FBI just needs the right tools. When investigators failed to break into the Trump rally shooter's phone in July, they sent the device to the FBI lab in Quantico, Virginia, where agents used an unreleased tool from the Israeli company Cellebrite to crack it in less than an hour.
Microsoft

Controversial Windows Recall AI Search Tool Returns (securityweek.com) 68

wiredmikey writes: Three months after pulling previews of the controversial Windows Recall feature due to public backlash, Microsoft says it has completely overhauled the security architecture with proof-of-presence encryption, anti-tampering and DLP checks, and screenshot data managed in secure enclaves outside the main operating system.

In an interview with SecurityWeek, Microsoft vice president David Weston said the company's engineers rewrote the security model of Windows Recall to reduce attack surface on Copilot+ PCs and minimize the risk of malware attackers targeting the screenshot data store.

Encryption

Global Police Dismantle Encrypted Messaging App Used By Criminals (ft.com) 36

International police forces have taken down an encrypted communication platform and arrested 51 people, marking a success for co-ordinated efforts to crack down on anonymous messaging services used by criminal groups. FT: Europol and law enforcement agencies from nine countries dismantled Ghost [non-paywalled source], an online platform which used three different encryption standards and allowed users to destroy all messages by sending a specific code, Europol announced on Wednesday. The crackdown is the latest operation by international agencies to decode encrypted messaging services used by criminals to manage their international operations, following the takedown of platforms such as EncroChat and Sky ECC in recent years.

[...] McLean said Ghost was administered by a 32-year-old man from Australia, one of the operation's principal targets. As a result of the decryption operation, where officers broke the app's code so they could read users' messages, the death or injury of as many as 50 people could have been prevented, McLean said.

Encryption

Chrome Switching To NIST-Approved ML-KEM Quantum Encryption (bleepingcomputer.com) 52

Google is updating the post-quantum cryptography in Chrome, replacing the experimental Kyber with the fully standardized Module Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) to enhance protection against quantum computing attacks. BleepingComputer reports: This change comes roughly five months after Google rolled out the post-quantum secure TLS key encapsulation system on Chrome stable for all users, which also caused some problems with TLS exchanges. The move from Kyber to ML-KEM though is not related to those early problems, that got resolved soon after manifesting. Rather, its a strategic choice to abandon an experimental system for a NIST-approved and fully standardized mechanism.

ML-KEM was fully endorsed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in mid-August, with the agency publishing the complete technical specifications of the final version at the time. Google explains that despite the technical changes from Kyber to ML-KEM being minor, the two are essentially incompatible, so a switch had to be made. "The changes to the final version of ML-KEM make it incompatible with the previously deployed version of Kyber," explains Google. "As a result, the codepoint in TLS for hybrid post-quantum key exchange is changing from 0x6399 for Kyber768+X25519, to 0x11EC for ML-KEM768+X25519."

Android

iOS 18 Rolling Out RCS To the iPhone For Better Android Messaging (9to5google.com) 23

Apple today is rolling out iOS 18, introducing support for Rich Communications Services (RCS) to enhance messaging between iPhone and Android devices with features like typing indicators, read receipts, and higher resolution media. "However, there continues to be no end-to-end encryption (E2EE), with work towards that between Android and iOS continuing," notes 9to5Google. The feature will be enabled by default on iPhones with major U.S. carriers supported, but smaller MVNOs are not yet included.
Linux

Linux Kernel 6.11 is Out 9

Linux creator Linus Torvalds has released version 6.11 of the open-source operating system kernel. The new release, while not considered major by Torvalds, introduces several notable improvements for AMD hardware users and Arch Linux developers. ZDNet: This latest version introduces several enhancements, particularly for AMD hardware users, while offering broader system improvements and new capabilities. These include:
RDNA4 Graphics Support: The kernel now includes baseline support for AMD's upcoming RDNA4 graphics architecture. This early integration bodes well for future AMD GPU releases, ensuring Linux users have day-one support.
Core Performance Boost: The AMD P-State driver now includes handling for AMD Core Performance Boost. This driver gives AMD Core users more granular control over turbo and boost frequency ranges.
Fast Collaborative Processor Performance Control (CPPC) Support: Overclockers who want the most power possible from their computers will be happy with this improvement to the AMD P-State driver. This feature enhances power efficiency on recent Ryzen (Zen 4) mobile processors. This can improve performance by 2-6% without increasing power consumption.
AES-GCM Crypto Performance: AMD and Intel CPUs benefit from significantly faster AES-GCM encryption and decryption processing, up to 160% faster than previous versions.
Supercomputing

As Quantum Computing Threats Loom, Microsoft Updates Its Core Crypto Library (arstechnica.com) 33

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Microsoft has updated a key cryptographic library with two new encryption algorithms designed to withstand attacks from quantum computers. The updates were made last week to SymCrypt, a core cryptographic code library for handing cryptographic functions in Windows and Linux. The library, started in 2006, provides operations and algorithms developers can use to safely implement secure encryption, decryption, signing, verification, hashing, and key exchange in the apps they create. The library supports federal certification requirements for cryptographic modules used in some governmental environments. Despite the name, SymCrypt supports both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. It's the main cryptographic library Microsoft uses in products and services including Azure, Microsoft 365, all supported versions of Windows, Azure Stack HCI, and Azure Linux. The library provides cryptographic security used in email security, cloud storage, web browsing, remote access, and device management. Microsoft documented the update in a post on Monday. The updates are the first steps in implementing a massive overhaul of encryption protocols that incorporate a new set of algorithms that aren't vulnerable to attacks from quantum computers. [...]

The first new algorithm Microsoft added to SymCrypt is called ML-KEM. Previously known as CRYSTALS-Kyber, ML-KEM is one of three post-quantum standards formalized last month by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The KEM in the new name is short for key encapsulation. KEMs can be used by two parties to negotiate a shared secret over a public channel. Shared secrets generated by a KEM can then be used with symmetric-key cryptographic operations, which aren't vulnerable to Shor's algorithm when the keys are of a sufficient size. [...] The other algorithm added to SymCrypt is the NIST-recommended XMSS. Short for eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme, it's based on "stateful hash-based signature schemes." These algorithms are useful in very specific contexts such as firmware signing, but are not suitable for more general uses. Monday's post said Microsoft will add additional post-quantum algorithms to SymCrypt in the coming months. They are ML-DSA, a lattice-based digital signature scheme, previously called Dilithium, and SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature scheme previously called SPHINCS+. Both became NIST standards last month and are formally referred to as FIPS 204 and FIPS 205.
In Monday's post, Microsoft Principal Product Manager Lead Aabha Thipsay wrote: "PQC algorithms offer a promising solution for the future of cryptography, but they also come with some trade-offs. For example, these typically require larger key sizes, longer computation times, and more bandwidth than classical algorithms. Therefore, implementing PQC in real-world applications requires careful optimization and integration with existing systems and standards."
Privacy

The NSA Has a Podcast (wired.com) 14

Steven Levy, writing for Wired: My first story for WIRED -- yep, 31 years ago -- looked at a group of "crypto rebels" who were trying to pry strong encryption technology from the government-classified world and send it into the mainstream. Naturally I attempted to speak to someone at the National Security Agency for comment and ideally get a window into its thinking. Unsurprisingly, that was a no-go, because the NSA was famous for its reticence. Eventually we agreed that I could fax (!) a list of questions. In return I got an unsigned response in unhelpful bureaucratese that didn't address my queries. Even that represented a loosening of what once was total blackout on anything having to do with this ultra-secretive intelligence agency. For decades after its post-World War II founding, the government revealed nothing, not even the name, of this agency and its activities. Those in the know referred to it as "No Such Agency."

In recent years, the widespread adoption of encryption technology and the vital need for cybersecurity has led to more openness. Its directors began to speak in public; in 2012, NSA director Keith Alexander actually keynoted Defcon. I'd spent the entire 1990s lobbying to visit the agency for my book Crypto; in 2013, I finally crossed the threshold of its iconic Fort Meade Headquarters for an on-the-record conversation with officials, including Alexander. NSA now has social media accounts on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook. And there is a form on the agency website for podcasters to request guest appearances by an actual NSA-ite.

So it shouldn't be a total shock that NSA is now doing its own podcast. You don't need to be an intelligence agency to know that pods are a unique way to tell stories and hold people's attention. The first two episodes of the seven-part season dropped this week. It's called No Such Podcast, earning some self-irony points from the get-go. In keeping with the openness vibe, the NSA granted me an interview with an official in charge of the project -- one of the de facto podcast producers, a title that apparently is still not an official NSA job posting. Since NSA still gotta NSA, I can't use this person's name. But my source did point out that in the podcast itself, both the hosts and the guests -- who are past and present agency officials -- speak under their actual identities.

Privacy

Signal is More Than Encrypted Messaging. It Wants to Prove Surveillance Capitalism Is Wrong (wired.com) 70

Slashdot reader echo123 shared a new article from Wired titled "Signal Is More Than Encrypted Messaging. Under Meredith Whittaker, It's Out to Prove Surveillance Capitalism Wrong." ("On its 10th anniversary, Signal's president wants to remind you that the world's most secure communications platform is a nonprofit. It's free. It doesn't track you or serve you ads. It pays its engineers very well. And it's a go-to app for hundreds of millions of people.") Ten years ago, WIRED published a news story about how two little-known, slightly ramshackle encryption apps called RedPhone and TextSecure were merging to form something called Signal. Since that July in 2014, Signal has transformed from a cypherpunk curiosity — created by an anarchist coder, run by a scrappy team working in a single room in San Francisco, spread word-of-mouth by hackers competing for paranoia points — into a full-blown, mainstream, encrypted communications phenomenon... Billions more use Signal's encryption protocols integrated into platforms like WhatsApp...

But Signal is, in many ways, the exact opposite of the Silicon Valley model. It's a nonprofit funded by donations. It has never taken investment, makes its product available for free, has no advertisements, and collects virtually no information on its users — while competing with tech giants and winning... Signal stands as a counterfactual: evidence that venture capitalism and surveillance capitalism — hell, capitalism, period — are not the only paths forward for the future of technology.

Over its past decade, no leader of Signal has embodied that iconoclasm as visibly as Meredith Whittaker. Signal's president since 2022 is one of the world's most prominent tech critics: When she worked at Google, she led walkouts to protest its discriminatory practices and spoke out against its military contracts. She cofounded the AI Now Institute to address ethical implications of artificial intelligence and has become a leading voice for the notion that AI and surveillance are inherently intertwined. Since she took on the presidency at the Signal Foundation, she has come to see her central task as working to find a long-term taproot of funding to keep Signal alive for decades to come — with zero compromises or corporate entanglements — so it can serve as a model for an entirely new kind of tech ecosystem...

Meredith Whittaker: "The Signal model is going to keep growing, and thriving and providing, if we're successful. We're already seeing Proton [a startup that offers end-to-end encrypted email, calendars, note-taking apps, and the like] becoming a nonprofit. It's the paradigm shift that's going to involve a lot of different forces pointing in a similar direction."

Key quotes from the interview:
  • "Given that governments in the U.S. and elsewhere have not always been uncritical of encryption, a future where we have jurisdictional flexibility is something we're looking at."
  • "It's not by accident that WhatsApp and Apple are spending billions of dollars defining themselves as private. Because privacy is incredibly valuable. And who's the gold standard for privacy? It's Signal."
  • "AI is a product of the mass surveillance business model in its current form. It is not a separate technological phenomenon."
  • "...alternative models have not received the capital they need, the support they need. And they've been swimming upstream against a business model that opposes their success. It's not for lack of ideas or possibilities. It's that we actually have to start taking seriously the shifts that are going to be required to do this thing — to build tech that rejects surveillance and centralized control — whose necessity is now obvious to everyone."

Crime

Was the Arrest of Telegram's CEO Inevitable? (platformer.news) 174

Casey Newton, former senior editor at the Verge, weighs in on Platformer about the arrest of Telegram CEO Pavel Durov.

"Fending off onerous speech regulations and overzealous prosecutors requires that platform builders act responsibly. Telegram never even pretended to." Officially, Telegram's terms of service prohibit users from posting illegal pornographic content or promotions of violence on public channels. But as the Stanford Internet Observatory noted last year in an analysis of how CSAM spreads online, these terms implicitly permit users who share CSAM in private channels as much as they want to. "There's illegal content on Telegram. How do I take it down?" asks a question on Telegram's FAQ page. The company declares that it will not intervene in any circumstances: "All Telegram chats and group chats are private amongst their participants," it states. "We do not process any requests related to them...."

Telegram can look at the contents of private messages, making it vulnerable to law enforcement requests for that data. Anticipating these requests, Telegram created a kind of jurisdictional obstacle course for law enforcement that (it says) none of them have successfully navigated so far. From the FAQ again:

To protect the data that is not covered by end-to-end encryption, Telegram uses a distributed infrastructure. Cloud chat data is stored in multiple data centers around the globe that are controlled by different legal entities spread across different jurisdictions. The relevant decryption keys are split into parts and are never kept in the same place as the data they protect. As a result, several court orders from different jurisdictions are required to force us to give up any data. [...] To this day, we have disclosed 0 bytes of user data to third parties, including governments.

As a result, investigation after investigation finds that Telegram is a significant vector for the spread of CSAM.... The company's refusal to answer almost any law enforcement request, no matter how dire, has enabled some truly vile behavior. "Telegram is another level," Brian Fishman, Meta's former anti-terrorism chief, wrote in a post on Threads. "It has been the key hub for ISIS for a decade. It tolerates CSAM. Its ignored reasonable [law enforcement] engagement for YEARS. It's not 'light' content moderation; it's a different approach entirely.

The article asks whether France's action "will embolden countries around the world to prosecute platform CEOs criminally for failing to turn over user data." On the other hand, Telegram really does seem to be actively enabling a staggering amount of abuse. And while it's disturbing to see state power used indiscriminately to snoop on private conversations, it's equally disturbing to see a private company declare itself to be above the law.

Given its behavior, a legal intervention into Telegram's business practices was inevitable. But the end of private conversation, and end-to-end encryption, need not be.

Social Networks

Washington Post Calls Telegram 'a Haven for Free Speech - and Child Predators' (yahoo.com) 82

The Washington Post writes that Telegram's "anything-goes approach" to its 950 million users "has also made it one of the internet's largest havens for child predators, experts say...."

"Durov's critics say his public idealism masks an opportunistic business model that allows Telegram to profit from the worst the internet has to offer, including child sexual abuse material, or CSAM... " [Telegram is] an app of choice for political organizing, including by dissidents under repressive regimes. But it is equally appealing for terrorist groups, criminal organizations and sexual predators, who use it as a hub to share and consume nonconsensual pornography, AI "deepfake" nudes, and illegal sexual images and videos of exploited minors, said Alex Stamos, chief information security officer at the cybersecurity firm SentinelOne. "Due to their advertised policy of not cooperating with law enforcement, and the fact that they are known not to scan for CSAM, Telegram has attracted large groups of pedophiles trading and selling child abuse materials," Stamos said.

That reach comes even though many Telegram exchanges don't actually use the strong forms of encryption available on true private messaging apps, he added. Telegram is used for private messaging, public posts and group chats. Only one-to-one conversations can be encrypted in a way that even Telegram can't access them. And that occurs only if users choose the option, meaning the company could turn over everything else to governments if it wanted to... French prosecutors argue that Durov is in fact responsible for Telegram's emergence as a global haven for illegal content, including CSAM, because of his reluctance to moderate it and his refusal to help authorities police it, among other allegations...

David Kaye, a professor at University of California, Irvine School of Law and former U.N. special rapporteur on freedom of expression... said that while Telegram has at times banned groups and taken down [CSAM] content in response to law enforcement, its refusal to share data with investigators sets it apart from most other major tech companies. Unlike U.S.-based platforms, Telegram is not required by U.S. law to report instances of CSAM to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, or NCMEC. Many online platforms based overseas do so anyway — but not Telegram. "NCMEC has tried to get them to report, but they have no interest and are known for not wanting to work with [law enforcement agencies] or anyone in this space," a NCMEC spokesperson said.

The Post also writes that Telegram "has repeatedly been revealed to serve as a tool to store, distribute and share child sexual imagery." (They cite several examples, including two different men convicted to minimum sentences of at least 10 years for using the service to purchase CSAM and solicit explicit photos from minors.)
Encryption

Telegram Founder's Indictment Thrusts Encryption Into the Spotlight (nytimes.com) 124

An anonymous reader shares a report: When French prosecutors charged Pavel Durov, the chief executive of the messaging app Telegram, with a litany of criminal offenses on Wednesday, one accusation stood out to Silicon Valley companies. Telegram, French authorities said in a statement, had provided cryptology services aimed at ensuring confidentiality without a license. In other words, the topic of encryption was being thrust into the spotlight.

The cryptology charge raised eyebrows at U.S. tech companies including Signal, Apple and Meta's WhatsApp, according to three people with knowledge of the companies. These companies provide end-to-end encrypted messaging services and often stand together when governments challenge their use of the technology, which keeps online conversations between users private and secure from outsiders.

But while Telegram is also often described as an encrypted messaging app, it tackles encryption differently than WhatsApp, Signal and others. So if Mr. Durov's indictment turned Telegram into a public exemplar of the technology, some Silicon Valley companies believe that could damage the credibility of encrypted messaging apps writ large, according to the people, putting them in a tricky position of whether to rally around their rival.

Encryption has been a long-running point of friction between governments and tech companies around the world. For years, tech companies have argued that encrypted messaging is crucial to maintain people's digital privacy, while law enforcement and governments have said that the technology enables illicit behaviors by hiding illegal activity. The debate has grown more heated as encrypted messaging apps have become mainstream. Signal has grown by tens of millions of users since its founding in 2018. Apple's iMessage is installed on the hundreds of millions of iPhones that the company sells each year. WhatsApp is used by more than two billion people globally.

Encryption

Feds Bust Alaska Man With 10,000+ CSAM Images Despite His Many Encrypted Apps (arstechnica.com) 209

A recent indictment (PDF) of an Alaska man stands out due to the sophisticated use of multiple encrypted communication tools, privacy-focused apps, and dark web technology. "I've never seen anyone who, when arrested, had three Samsung Galaxy phones filled with 'tens of thousands of videos and images' depicting CSAM, all of it hidden behind a secrecy-focused, password-protected app called 'Calculator Photo Vault,'" writes Ars Technica's Nate Anderson. "Nor have I seen anyone arrested for CSAM having used all of the following: [Potato Chat, Enigma, nandbox, Telegram, TOR, Mega NZ, and web-based generative AI tools/chatbots]." An anonymous reader shares the report: According to the government, Seth Herrera not only used all of these tools to store and download CSAM, but he also created his own -- and in two disturbing varieties. First, he allegedly recorded nude minor children himself and later "zoomed in on and enhanced those images using AI-powered technology." Secondly, he took this imagery he had created and then "turned to AI chatbots to ensure these minor victims would be depicted as if they had engaged in the type of sexual contact he wanted to see." In other words, he created fake AI CSAM -- but using imagery of real kids.

The material was allegedly stored behind password protection on his phone(s) but also on Mega and on Telegram, where Herrera is said to have "created his own public Telegram group to store his CSAM." He also joined "multiple CSAM-related Enigma groups" and frequented dark websites with taglines like "The Only Child Porn Site you need!" Despite all the precautions, Herrera's home was searched and his phones were seized by Homeland Security Investigations; he was eventually arrested on August 23. In a court filing that day, a government attorney noted that Herrera "was arrested this morning with another smartphone -- the same make and model as one of his previously seized devices."

The government is cagey about how, exactly, this criminal activity was unearthed, noting only that Herrera "tried to access a link containing apparent CSAM." Presumably, this "apparent" CSAM was a government honeypot file or web-based redirect that logged the IP address and any other relevant information of anyone who clicked on it. In the end, given that fatal click, none of the "I'll hide it behind an encrypted app that looks like a calculator!" technical sophistication accomplished much. Forensic reviews of Herrera's three phones now form the primary basis for the charges against him, and Herrera himself allegedly "admitted to seeing CSAM online for the past year and a half" in an interview with the feds.

The Military

Telegram CEO Pavel Durov's Arrest Upends Kremlin Military Communications (politico.eu) 107

Telegram founder and CEO Pavel Durov was arrested Saturday night by French authorities on allegations that his social media platform was being used for child pornography, drug trafficking and organized crime. The move sparked debate over free speech worldwide from prominent anti-censorship figures including Elon Musk, Robert F. Kennedy. Jr. and Edward Snowden. However, "the immediate freakout came from Russia," reports Politico. "That's because Telegram is widely used by the Russian military for battlefield communications thanks to problems with rolling out its own secure comms system. It's also the primary vehicle for pro-war military bloggers and media -- as well as millions of ordinary Russians." From the report: "They practically detained the head of communication of the Russian army," Russian military blogger channel Povernutie na Z Voine said in a Telegram statement. The blog site Dva Mayora said that Russian specialists are working on an alternative to Telegram, but that the Russian army's Main Communications Directorate has "not shown any real interest" in getting such a system to Russian troops. The site said Durov's arrest may actually speed up the development of an independent comms system. Alarmed Russian policymakers are calling for Durov's release.

"[Durov's] arrest may have political grounds and be a tool for gaining access to the personal information of Telegram users," the Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma Vladislav Davankov said in a Telegram statement. "This cannot be allowed. If the French authorities refuse to release Pavel Durov from custody, I propose making every effort to move him to the UAE or the Russian Federation. With his consent, of course." Their worry is that Durov may hand over encryption keys to the French authorities, allowing access to the platform and any communications that users thought was encrypted.

French President Emmanuel Macron said Monday that the arrest of Durov was "in no way a political decision." The Russian embassy has demanded that it get access to Durov, but the Kremlin has so far not issued a statement on the arrest. "Before saying anything, we should wait for the situation to become clearer," said Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. However, officials and law enforcement agencies were instructed to clear all their communication from Telegram, the pro-Kremlin channel Baza reported. "Everyone who is used to using the platform for sensitive conversations/conversations should delete those conversations right now and not do it again," Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan said in a Telegram post. "Durov has been shut down to get the keys. And he's going to give them."

Crime

ARRL Pays $1 Million Ransom To Decrypt Their Systems After Attack (bleepingcomputer.com) 95

The nonprofit American Radio Relay League — founded in 1914 — has approximately 161,000 members, according to Wikipedia (with over 7,000 members outside the U.S.)

But sometime in early May its systems network was compromised, "by threat actors using information they had purchased on the dark web," the nonprofit announced this week. The attackers accessed the ARRL's on-site systems — as well as most of its cloud-based systems — using "a wide variety of payloads affecting everything from desktops and laptops to Windows-based and Linux-based servers." Despite the wide variety of target configurations, the threat actors seemed to have a payload that would host and execute encryption or deletion of network-based IT assets, as well as launch demands for a ransom payment, for every system... The FBI categorized the attack as "unique" as they had not seen this level of sophistication among the many other attacks, they have experience with.

Within 3 hours a crisis management team had been constructed of ARRL management, an outside vendor with extensive resources and experience in the ransomware recovery space, attorneys experienced with managing the legal aspects of the attack including interfacing with the authorities, and our insurance carrier. The authorities were contacted immediately as was the ARRL President... [R]ansom demands were dramatically weakened by the fact that they did not have access to any compromising data. It was also clear that they believed ARRL had extensive insurance coverage that would cover a multi-million-dollar ransom payment. After days of tense negotiation and brinkmanship, ARRL agreed to pay a $1 million ransom. That payment, along with the cost of restoration, has been largely covered by our insurance policy...

Today, most systems have been restored or are waiting for interfaces to come back online to interconnect them. While we have been in restoration mode, we have also been working to simplify the infrastructure to the extent possible. We anticipate that it may take another month or two to complete restoration under the new infrastructure guidelines and new standards.

ARRL's called the attack "extensive", "sophisticated", "highly coordinated" and "an act of organized crime". And tlhIngan (Slashdot reader #30335) shared this detail from BleepingComputer.

"While the organization has not yet linked the attack to a specific ransomware operation, sources told BleepingComputer that the Embargo ransomware gang was behind the breach."
Privacy

US Feds Are Tapping a Half-Billion Encrypted Messaging Goldmine (404media.co) 77

An anonymous reader shares a report: U.S. agencies are increasingly accessing parts of a half-billion encrypted chat message haul that has rocked the global organized crime underground, using the chats as part of multiple drug trafficking prosecutions, according to a 404 Media review of U.S. court records. In particular, U.S. authorities are using the chat messages to prosecute alleged maritime drug smugglers who traffic cocaine using speedboats and commercial ships.

The court records show the continued fallout of the massive hack of encrypted phone company Sky in 2021, in which European agencies obtained the intelligence goldmine of messages despite Sky being advertised as end-to-end encrypted. European authorities have used those messages as the basis for many prosecutions and drug seizures across the continent. Now, it's clear that the blast radius extends to the United States.

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