An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Microsoft is killing off an obsolete and vulnerable encryption cipher that Windows has supported by default for 26 years following more than a decade of devastating hacks that exploited it and recently faced blistering criticism from a prominent US senator. When the software maker rolled out Active Directory in 2000, it made RC4 a sole means of securing the Windows component, which administrators use to configure and provision fellow administrator and user accounts inside large organizations. RC4, short for Rivist Cipher 4, is a nod to mathematician and cryptographer Ron Rivest of RSA Security, who developed the stream cipher in 1987. Within days of the trade-secret-protected algorithm being leaked in 1994, a researcher demonstrated a cryptographic attack that significantly weakened the security it had been believed to provide. Despite the known susceptibility, RC4 remained a staple in encryption protocols, including SSL and its successor TLS, until about a decade ago. [...]

Last week, Microsoft said it was finally deprecating RC4 and cited its susceptibility to Kerberoasting, the form of attack, known since 2014, that was the root cause of the initial intrusion into Ascension's network. "By mid-2026, we will be updating domain controller defaults for the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) on Windows Server 2008 and later to only allow AES-SHA1 encryption," Matthew Palko, a Microsoft principal program manager, wrote. "RC4 will be disabled by default and only used if a domain administrator explicitly configures an account or the KDC to use it." [...] Following next year's change, RC4 authentication will no longer function unless administrators perform the extra work to allow it. In the meantime, Palko said, it's crucial that admins identify any systems inside their networks that rely on the cipher. Despite the known vulnerabilities, RC4 remains the sole means of some third-party legacy systems for authenticating to Windows networks. These systems can often go overlooked in networks even though they are required for crucial functions.

To streamline the identification of such systems, Microsoft is making several tools available. One is an update to KDC logs that will track both requests and responses that systems make using RC4 when performing requests through Kerberos. Kerberos is an industry-wide authentication protocol for verifying the identities of users and services over a non-secure network. It's the sole means for mutual authentication to Active Directory, which hackers attacking Windows networks widely consider a Holy Grail because of the control they gain once it has been compromised. Microsoft is also introducing new PowerShell scripts to sift through security event logs to more easily pinpoint problematic RC4 usage. Microsoft said it has steadily worked over the past decade to deprecate RC4, but that the task wasn't easy. "The problem though is that it's hard to kill off a cryptographic algorithm that is present in every OS that's shipped for the last 25 years and was the default algorithm for so long, Steve Syfuhs, who runs Microsoft's Windows Authentication team, wrote on Bluesky. "See," he continued, "the problem is not that the algorithm exists. The problem is how the algorithm is chosen, and the rules governing that spanned 20 years of code changes."

Cloudflare's sixth annual Year in Review report describes an internet increasingly shaped by two forces: automated traffic and government intervention, as global connectivity grew 19% year over year in 2025.

Google's web crawler now dominates automated traffic, dwarfing other AI and indexing bots to become the single largest source of bot activity on the web. Nearly half of all major internet disruptions globally were linked to government actions, and civil society and non-profit organizations became the most attacked sector for the first time.

Post-quantum encryption crossed a significant threshold, now protecting 52% of human internet traffic observed by Cloudflare. The company also recorded more than 25 record-breaking DDoS attacks throughout the year.

The pro-Russian CyberVolk group resurfaced with a Telegram-based ransomware-as-a-service platform, but fatally undermined its own operation by hardcoding master encryption keys in plaintext. The Register reports: First, the bad news: the CyberVolk 2.x (aka VolkLocker) ransomware-as-a-service operation that launched in late summer. It's run entirely through Telegram, which makes it very easy for affiliates that aren't that tech savvy to lock files and demand a ransom payment. CyberVolk's soldiers can use the platform's built-in automation to generate payloads, coordinate ransomware attacks, and manage their illicit business operations, conducting everything through Telegram.

But here's the good news: the ransomware slingers got sloppy when it came time to debug their code and hardcoded the master keys -- this same key encrypts all files on a victim's system -- into the executable files. This could allow victims to recover encrypted data without paying the extortion fee, according to SentinelOne senior threat researcher Jim Walter, who detailed the gang's resurgence and flawed code in a Thursday report.

Online retailer Coupang, often called South Korea's Amazon, is dealing with the fallout from a breach that exposed the personal information of more than 33 million accounts -- roughly two-thirds of the country's population -- after a former contractor allegedly used credentials that remained active months after his departure to access customer data through the company's overseas servers.

The breach began in June but went undetected until November 18, according to Coupang and investigators. Police have called it South Korea's worst-ever data breach. The compromised information includes names, phone numbers, email addresses and shipping addresses, though the company says login credentials, credit card numbers, and payment details were not affected.

Coupang's former CEO Park Dae-jun told a parliamentary hearing that the alleged perpetrator was a Chinese national who had worked on authentication tasks before his contract ended last December. Chief information security officer Brett Matthes testified that the individual had a "privileged role" giving him access to a private encryption key that allowed him to forge tokens to impersonate customers. Legislators say the key remained active after the employee left. The CEO of Coupang's South Korean subsidiary has resigned. Founder and chair Bom Kim has yet to personally apologize but has been summoned to a second parliamentary hearing.

Berlin's regional parliament has passed a far-reaching overhaul of its "security" law, giving police new authority to conduct both digital and physical surveillance. From a report: The CDU-SPD coalition, supported by AfD votes, approved the reform of the General Security and Public Order Act (ASOG), changing the limits that once protected Berliners from intrusive policing. Interior Senator Iris Spranger (SPD) argued that the legislation modernizes police work for an era of encrypted communication, terrorism, and cybercrime. But it undermines core civil liberties and reshapes the relationship between citizens and the state.

One of the most controversial elements is the expansion of police powers under paragraphs 26a and 26b. These allow investigators to hack into computers and smartphones under the banner of "source telecommunications surveillance" and "online searches." Police may now install state-developed spyware, known as trojans, on personal devices to intercept messages before or after encryption.

If the software cannot be deployed remotely, the law authorizes officers to secretly enter a person's home to gain access. This enables police to install surveillance programs directly on hardware without the occupant's knowledge. Berlin had previously resisted such practices, but now joins other federal states that permit physical entry to install digital monitoring tools.

FreeBSD 15.0-RELEASE arrived this week, notes this report from The Register, which calls it the latest release "of the Unix world's leading alternative to Linux." As well as numerous bug fixes and upgrades to many of its components, the major changes in this version are reductions in the number of platforms the OS supports, and in how it's built and how its component software is packaged.

FreeBSD 15 has significantly reduced support for 32-bit platforms. Compared to FreeBSD 14 in 2023, there are no longer builds for x86-32, POWER, or ARM-v6. As the release notes put it:

"The venerable 32-bit hardware platforms i386, armv6, and 32-bit powerpc have been retired. 32-bit application support lives on via the 32-bit compatibility mode in their respective 64-bit platforms. The armv7 platform remains as the last supported 32-bit platform. We thank them for their service."

Now FreeBSD supports five CPU architectures — two Tier-1 platforms, x86-64 and AArch64, and three Tier-2 platforms, armv7 and up, powerpc64le, and riscv64.

Arguably, it's time. AMD's first 64-bit chips started shipping 22 years ago. Intel launched the original x86 chip, the 8086 in 1978. These days, 64-bit is nearly as old as the entire Intel 80x86 platform was when the 64-bit versions first appeared. In comparison, a few months ago, Debian 13 also dropped its x86-32 edition — six years after Canonical launched its first x86-64-only distro, Ubuntu 19.10.

Another significant change is that this is the first version built under the new pkgbase system, although it's still experimental and optional for now. If you opt for a pkgbase installation, then the core OS itself is installed from multiple separate software packages, meaning that the whole system can be updated using the package manager. Over in the Linux world, this is the norm, but Linux is a very different beast... The plan is that by FreeBSD 16, scheduled for December 2027, the restructure will be complete, the old distribution sets will be removed, and the current freebsd-update command and its associated infrastructure can be turned off.

Another significant change is reproducible builds, a milestone the project reached in late October. This change is part of a multi-project initiative toward ensuring deterministic compilation: to be able to demonstrate that a certain set of source files and compilation directives is guaranteed to produce identical binaries, as a countermeasure against compromised code. A handy side-effect is that building the whole OS, including installation media images, no longer needs root access.

There are of course other new features. Lots of drivers and subsystems have been updated, and this release has better power management, including suspend and resume. There's improved wireless networking, with support for more Wi-Fi chipsets and faster wireless standards, plus updated graphics drivers... The release announcement calls out the inclusion of OpenZFS 2.4.0-rc4, OpenSSL 3.5.4, and OpenSSH 10.0 p2, and notes the inclusion of some new quantum-resistant encryption systems...

In general, we found FreeBSD 15 easier and less complicated to work with than either of the previous major releases. It should be easier on servers too. The new OCI container support in FreeBSD 14.2, which we wrote about a year ago, is more mature now. FreeBSD has its own version of Podman, and you can run Linux containers on FreeBSD. This means you can use Docker commands and tools, which are familiar to many more developers than FreeBSD's native Jail system.

"FreeBSD has its own place in servers and the public cloud, but it's getting easier to run it as a desktop OS as well," the article concludes. "It can run all the main Linux desktops, including GNOME on Wayland."

"There's no systemd here, and never will be — and no Flatpak or Snap either, for that matter.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from TechCrunch: Earlier this year, home goods maker Kohler launched a smart camera called the Dekoda that attaches to your toilet bowl, takes pictures of it, and analyzes the images to advise you on your gut health. Anticipating privacy fears, Kohler said on its website that the Dekoda's sensors only see down into the toilet, and claimed that all data is secured with "end-to-end encryption." The company's use of the expression "end-to-end encryption" is, however, wrong, as security researcher Simon Fondrie-Teitler pointed out in a blog post on Tuesday. By reading Kohler's privacy policy, it's clear that the company is referring to the type of encryption that secures data as it travels over the internet, known as TLS encryption -- the same that powers HTTPS websites. [...] The security researcher also pointed out that given Kohler can access customers' data on its servers, it's possible Kohler is using customers' bowl pictures to train AI. Citing another response from the company representative, the researcher was told that Kohler's "algorithms are trained on de-identified data only." A "privacy contact" from Kohler said that user data is "encrypted at rest, when it's stored on the user's mobile phone, toilet attachment, and on our systems." The company also said that, "data in transit is also encrypted end-to-end, as it travels between the user's devices and our systems, where it is decrypted and processed to provide our service."

Their announcement calls it "more than a multicloud solution," saying it's "a step toward a more open cloud environment. The API specifications developed for this product are open for other providers and partners to adopt, as we aim to simplify global connectivity for everyone."

Amazon and Google are introducing "a jointly developed multicloud networking service," reports Reuters. "The initiative will enable customers to establish private, high-speed links between the two companies' computing platforms in minutes instead of weeks." The new service is being unveiled a little over a month after an Amazon Web Services outage on October 20 disrupted thousands of websites worldwide, knocking offline some of the internet's most popular apps, including Snapchat and Reddit. That outage will cost U.S. companies between $500 million and $650 million in losses, according to analytics firm Parametrix.
Google and Amazon are promising "high resiliency" through "quad-redundancy across physically redundant interconnect facilities and routers," with both Amazon and Google continuously watching for issues. (And they're using MACsec encryption between the Google Cloud and AWS edge routers, according to Sunday's announcement: As organizations increasingly adopt multicloud architectures, the need for interoperability between cloud service providers has never been greater. Historically, however, connecting these environments has been a challenge, forcing customers to take a complex "do-it-yourself" approach to managing global multi-layered networks at scale.... Previously, to connect cloud service providers, customers had to manually set up complex networking components including physical connections and equipment; this approach required lengthy lead times and coordinating with multiple internal and external teams. This could take weeks or even months. AWS had a vision for developing this capability as a unified specification that could be adopted by any cloud service provider, and collaborated with Google Cloud to bring it to market.

Now, this new solution reimagines multicloud connectivity by moving away from physical infrastructure management toward a managed, cloud-native experience.
Reuters points out that Salesforce "is among the early users of the new approach, Google Cloud said in a statement."

An anonymous reader shared this report from the Associated Press: The information needed to decipher the last remaining unsolved secret message embedded within a sculpture at CIA headquarters in Virginia sold at auction for nearly $1 million, the auction house announced Friday. The winner will get a private meeting with the 80-year-old artist to go over the codes and charts in hopes of continuing what he's been doing for decades: interacting with would-be cryptanalyst sleuths.

The archive owned by the artist who created Kryptos, Jim Sanborn, was sold to an anonymous bidder for $963,000, according to RR Auction of Boston. The archive includes documents and coding charts for the sculpture, dedicated in 1990. Three of the messages on the 10-foot-tall (3-meter) sculpture — known as K1, K2 and K3 — have been solved, but a solution for the fourth, K-4, has frustrated the experts and enthusiasts who have tried to decipher the S-shaped copper screen... One side has a series of staggered alphabets that are key to decoding the four encrypted messages on the other side.
"The purchaser's 'long-term stewardship plan' is being developed, according to the auction house."

An anonymous reader shares a report: CISA has warned that state-backed snoops and cyber-mercenaries are actively abusing commercial spyware to break into Signal and WhatsApp accounts, hijack devices, and quietly rummage through the phones of what the agency calls "high-value" users.

In an alert published Monday, the US government's cyber agency said it's tracking multiple miscreants that are using a mix of phishing, bogus QR codes, malicious app impersonation, and, in some cases, full-blown zero-click exploits to compromise messaging apps which most people assume are safe.

The agency says the activity it's seeing suggests an increasing focus on "high-value" individuals -- everyone from current and former senior government, military, and political officials to civil society groups across the US, the Middle East, and Europe. In many of the campaigns, attackers delivered spyware first and asked questions later, using the foothold to deploy more payloads and deepen their access.

In October cryptologist/CS professor Daniel J. Bernstein alleged that America's National Security Agency (and its UK counterpart GCHQ) were attempting to influence NIST to adopt weaker post-quantum cryptography standards without a "hybrid" approach that would've also included pre-quantum ECC.

Bernstein is of the opinion that "Given how many post-quantum proposals have been broken and the continuing flood of side-channel attacks, any competent engineering evaluation will conclude that the best way to deploy post-quantum [PQ] encryption for TLS, and for the Internet more broadly, is as double encryption: post-quantum cryptography on top of ECC." But he says he's seen it playing out differently: By 2013, NSA had a quarter-billion-dollar-a-year budget to "covertly influence and/or overtly leverage" systems to "make the systems in question exploitable"; in particular, to "influence policies, standards and specification for commercial public key technologies". NSA is quietly using stronger cryptography for the data it cares about, but meanwhile is spending money to promote a market for weakened cryptography, the same way that it successfully created decades of security failures by building up the market for, e.g., 40-bit RC4 and 512-bit RSA and Dual EC. I looked concretely at what was happening in IETF's TLS working group, compared to the consensus requirements for standards-development organizations. I reviewed how a call for "adoption" of an NSA-driven specification produced a variety of objections that weren't handled properly. ("Adoption" is a preliminary step before IETF standardization....) On 5 November 2025, the chairs issued "last call" for objections to publication of the document. The deadline for input is "2025-11-26", this coming Wednesday.
Bernstein also shares concerns about how the Internet Engineering Task Force is handling the discussion, and argues that the document is even "out of scope" for the IETF TLS working group This document doesn't serve any of the official goals in the TLS working group charter. Most importantly, this document is directly contrary to the "improve security" goal, so it would violate the charter even if it contributed to another goal... Half of the PQ proposals submitted to NIST in 2017 have been broken already... often with attacks having sufficiently low cost to demonstrate on readily available computer equipment. Further PQ software has been broken by implementation issues such as side-channel attacks.
He's also concerned about how that discussion is being handled: On 17 October 2025, they posted a "Notice of Moderation for Postings by D. J. Bernstein" saying that they would "moderate the postings of D. J. Bernstein for 30 days due to disruptive behavior effective immediately" and specifically that my postings "will be held for moderation and after confirmation by the TLS Chairs of being on topic and not disruptive, will be released to the list"...

I didn't send anything to the IETF TLS mailing list for 30 days after that. Yesterday [November 22nd] I finished writing up my new objection and sent that in. And, gee, after more than 24 hours it still hasn't appeared... Presumably the chairs "forgot" to flip the censorship button off after 30 days.
Thanks to alanw (Slashdot reader #1,822) for spotting the blog posts.

The International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR) was forced to cancel its leadership election after a trustee lost their portion of the Helios voting system's decryption key, making it impossible to reveal or verify the final results. Ars Technica reports: The IACR said Friday that the votes were submitted and tallied using Helios, an open source voting system that uses peer-reviewed cryptography to cast and count votes in a verifiable, confidential, and privacy-preserving way. Helios encrypts each vote in a way that assures each ballot is secret. Other cryptography used by Helios allows each voter to confirm their ballot was counted fairly. "Unfortunately, one of the three trustees has irretrievably lost their private key, an honest but unfortunate human mistake, and therefore cannot compute their decryption share," the IACR said. "As a result, Helios is unable to complete the decryption process, and it is technically impossible for us to obtain or verify the final outcome of this election."

The IACR will switch to a two-of-three private key system to prevent this sort of thing from happening again. Moti Yung, the trustee responsible for the incident, has resigned and is being replaced by Michael Abdalla.

"An engineer got curious about how his iLife A11 smart vacuum worked and monitored the network traffic coming from the device," writes Tom's Hardware.

"That's when he noticed it was constantly sending logs and telemetry data to the manufacturer — something he hadn't consented to." The user, Harishankar, decided to block the telemetry servers' IP addresses on his network, while keeping the firmware and OTA servers open. While his smart gadget worked for a while, it just refused to turn on soon after... He sent it to the service center multiple times, wherein the technicians would turn it on and see nothing wrong with the vacuum. When they returned it to him, it would work for a few days and then fail to boot again... [H]e decided to disassemble the thing to determine what killed it and to see if he could get it working again...

[He discovered] a GD32F103 microcontroller to manage its plethora of sensors, including Lidar, gyroscopes, and encoders. He created PCB connectors and wrote Python scripts to control them with a computer, presumably to test each piece individually and identify what went wrong. From there, he built a Raspberry Pi joystick to manually drive the vacuum, proving that there was nothing wrong with the hardware. From this, he looked at its software and operating system, and that's where he discovered the dark truth: his smart vacuum was a security nightmare and a black hole for his personal data.

First of all, it's Android Debug Bridge, which gives him full root access to the vacuum, wasn't protected by any kind of password or encryption. The manufacturer added a makeshift security protocol by omitting a crucial file, which caused it to disconnect soon after booting, but Harishankar easily bypassed it. He then discovered that it used Google Cartographer to build a live 3D map of his home. This isn't unusual, by far. After all, it's a smart vacuum, and it needs that data to navigate around his home. However, the concerning thing is that it was sending off all this data to the manufacturer's server. It makes sense for the device to send this data to the manufacturer, as its onboard SoC is nowhere near powerful enough to process all that data. However, it seems that iLife did not clear this with its customers.

Furthermore, the engineer made one disturbing discovery — deep in the logs of his non-functioning smart vacuum, he found a command with a timestamp that matched exactly the time the gadget stopped working. This was clearly a kill command, and after he reversed it and rebooted the appliance, it roared back to life.
Thanks to long-time Slashdot reader registrations_suck for sharing the article.

Ubuntu "is adopting the memory-safe Rust language," reports ZDNet, citing remarks at this year's Ubuntu Summit from Jon Seager, Canonical's VP of engineering for Ubuntu: . Seager said the engineering team is focused on replacing key system components with Rust-based alternatives to enhance safety and resilience, starting with Ubuntu 25.10. He stressed that resilience and memory safety, not just performance, are the principal drivers: "It's the enhanced resilience and safety that is more easily achieved with Rust ports that are most attractive to me". This move is echoed in Ubuntu's adoption of sudo-rs, the Rust implementation of sudo, with fallback and opt-out mechanisms for users who want to use the old-school sudo command.

In addition to sudo-rs, Ubuntu 26.04 will use the Rust-based uutils/coreutils for Linux's default core utilities. This setup includes ls, cp, mv, and dozens of other basic Unix command-line tools. This Rust reimplementation aims for functional parity with GNU coreutils, with improved safety and maintainability.

On the desktop front, Ubuntu 26.04 will also bring seamless TPM-backed full disk encryption. If this approach reminds you of Windows BitLocker or MacOS FileVault, it should. That's the idea.
In other news, Canonical CEO Mark Shuttleworth said "I'm a believer in the potential of Linux to deliver a desktop that could have wider and universal appeal." (Although he also thinks "the open-source community needs to understand that building desktops for people who aren't engineers is different. We need to understand that the 'simple and just works' is also really important.")

Shuttleworth answered questions from Slashdot's readers in 2005 and 2012.

An anonymous reader shares a report: After last week's major AWS outage took Signal along with it, Elon Musk was quick to criticize the encrypted messaging app's reliance on big tech. But Signal president Meredith Whittaker argues that the company didn't have any other choice but to use AWS or another major cloud provider.

"The problem here is not that Signal 'chose' to run on AWS," Whittaker writes in a series of posts on Bluesky. "The problem is the concentration of power in the infrastructure space that means there isn't really another choice: the entire stack, practically speaking, is owned by 3-4 players."

In the thread, Whittaker says the number of people who didn't realize Signal uses AWS is "concerning," as it indicates they aren't aware of just how concentrated the cloud infrastructure industry is. "The question isn't 'why does Signal use AWS?'" Whittaker writes. "It's to look at the infrastructural requirements of any global, real-time, mass comms platform and ask how it is that we got to a place where there's no realistic alternative to AWS and the other hyperscalers."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from BleepingComputer: The number of victims paying ransomware threat actors has reached a new low, with just 23% of the breached companies giving in to attackers' demands. With some exceptions, the decline in payment resolution rates continues the trend that Coveware has observed for the past six years. In the first quarter of 2024, the payment percentage was 28%. Although it increased over the next period, it continued to drop, reaching an all-time low in the third quarter of 2025.

One explanation for this is that organizations implemented stronger and more targeted protections against ransomware, and authorities increasing pressure for victims not to pay the hackers. [...] Over the years, ransomware groups moved from pure encryption attacks to double extortion that came with data theft and the threat of a public leak. Coveware reports that more than 76% of the attacks it observed in Q3 2025 involved data exfiltration, which is now the primary objective for most ransomware groups. The company says that when it isolates the attacks that do not encrypt the data and only steal it, the payment rate plummets to 19%, which is also a record for that sub-category.

The average and median ransomware payments fell in Q3 compared to the previous quarter, reaching $377,000 and $140,000, respectively, according to Coveware. The shift may reflect large enterprises revising their ransom payment policies and recognizing that those funds are better spent on strengthening defenses against future attacks. The researchers also note that threat groups like Akira and Qilin, which accounted for 44% of all recorded attacks in Q3 2025, have switched focus to medium-sized firms that are currently more likely to pay a ransom. "Cyber defenders, law enforcement, and legal specialists should view this as validation of collective progress," Coveware says. "The work that gets put in to prevent attacks, minimize the impact of attacks, and successfully navigate a cyber extortion -- each avoided payment constricts cyber attackers of oxygen."

Kohler has launched the Dekoda, a $599 smart toilet camera that analyzes users' waste to track hydration, gut health, and detect potential issues like blood. "It also comes with a rechargeable battery, a USB connection, and a fingerprint sensor to identify who's using the toilet," reports TechCrunch. From the report: The Dekoda is currently available for preorder, with shipments scheduled to begin on October 21. In addition to the hardware purchase fee, customers will need to pay between $70 and $156 per year for a subscription. If you're uneasy about the privacy implications of putting a camera right below your private parts, the company says, "Dekoda's sensors see down into your toilet and nowhere else." It also notes that the resulting data is secured via end-to-end encryption.

"Eleven days ago, the nonprofit entity that develops the protocol, Signal Messenger LLC, published a 5,900-word write-up describing its latest updates that bring Signal a significant step toward being fully quantum-resistant," writes Ars Technica: The mechanism that has made this constant key evolution possible over the past decade is what protocol developers call a "double ratchet." Just as a traditional ratchet allows a gear to rotate in one direction but not in the other, the Signal ratchets allow messaging parties to create new keys based on a combination of preceding and newly agreed-upon secrets. The ratchets work in a single direction, the sending and receiving of future messages. Even if an adversary compromises a newly created secret, messages encrypted using older secrets can't be decrypted... [Signal developers describe a "ping-pong" behavior as parties take turns replacing ratchet key pairs one at a time.] Even though the ping-ponging keys are vulnerable to future quantum attacks, they are broadly believed to be secure against today's attacks from classical computers.

The Signal Protocol developers didn't want to remove them or the battle-tested code that produces them. That led to their decision to add quantum resistance by adding a third ratchet. This one uses a quantum-safe Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) to produce new secrets much like the Diffie-Hellman ratchet did before, ensuring quantum-safe, post-compromise security... The technical challenges were anything but easy. Elliptic curve keys generated in the X25519 implementation are about 32 bytes long, small enough to be added to each message without creating a burden on already constrained bandwidths or computing resources. A ML-KEM 768 key, by contrast, is 1,000 bytes. Additionally, Signal's design requires sending both an encryption key and a ciphertext, making the total size 2,272 bytes... To manage the asynchrony challenges, the developers turned to "erasure codes," a method of breaking up larger data into smaller pieces such that the original can be reconstructed using any sufficiently sized subset of chunks...

The Signal engineers have given this third ratchet the formal name: Sparse Post Quantum Ratchet, or SPQR for short. The third ratchet was designed in collaboration with PQShield, AIST, and New York University. The developers presented the erasure-code-based chunking and the high-level Triple Ratchet design at the Eurocrypt 2025 conference. Outside researchers are applauding the work. "If the normal encrypted messages we use are cats, then post-quantum ciphertexts are elephants," Matt Green, a cryptography expert at Johns Hopkins University, wrote in an interview. "So the problem here is to sneak an elephant through a tunnel designed for cats. And that's an amazing engineering achievement. But it also makes me wish we didn't have to deal with elephants."
Thanks to long-time Slashdot reader mspohr for sharing the article.

"A new study published on Monday found that communications from cellphone carriers, retailers, banks, and even militaries are being broadcast unencrypted through geostationary satellites..." reports Gizmodo. "The team obtained unencrypted internet communications from U.S. military sea vessels and even communications regarding narcotics trafficking from Mexican military and law enforcement." Researchers from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) and the University of Maryland scanned 39 of these satellites from a rooftop in Southern California over three years. They found that roughly half of the signals they analyzed were transmitting unencrypted data, potentially exposing everything from phone calls and military logistics to a retail chain's inventory. "There is a clear mismatch between how satellite customers expect data to be secured and how it is secured in practice," the researchers wrote in their paper titled "Don't Look Up: There Are Sensitive Internal Links in the Clear on GEO Satellites...." "They assumed that no one was ever going to check and scan all these satellites and see what was out there. That was their method of security," Aaron Schulman, a UCSD professor and co-lead of the study, told Wired....

Even more surprisingly, the researchers didn't need any fancy spy gear to collect this data. Their setup used only off-the-shelf hardware, including a $185 satellite dish, a $140 roof mount with a $195 motor, and a $230 tuner card. Altogether, the system cost roughly $750 and was installed on a university building in La Jolla, San Diego.

With their simple setup, the researchers were able to collect a wide range of communication data, including phone calls, texts, in-flight Wi-Fi data from airline passengers, and signals from electric utilities. They even obtained U.S. and Mexican military and law enforcement communications, as well as ATM transactions and corporate communications... When it came to telecoms, specifically, the team collected phone numbers, calls, and texts from customers of T-Mobile, AT&T Mexico, and Telmex... It only took the team nine hours to collect the phone numbers of over 2,700 T-Mobile users, along with some of their calls and text messages.
T-Mobile told Gizmodo the lack of encryption was "a vendor's technical misconfiguration" affecting "a limited number of cell sites" and was "not network-wide... [W]e implemented nationwide Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) encryption for all customers to further protect signaling traffic as it travels between mobile handsets and the network core, including call set up, numbers dialed and text message content. We appreciate our collaboration with the security research community, whose work helps reinforce our ongoing commitment to protecting customer data and enhances security across the industry."

Indeed, the researchers write that "Each time we discovered sensitive information in our data, we went through considerable effort to determine the responsible party, establish contact, and disclose the vulnerability. In several cases, the responsible party told us that they had deployed a remedy. For the following parties, we re-scanned with their permission and were able to verify a remedy had been deployed: T-Mobile, WalMart, and KPU."

The researchers acknowledge that exposure "was limited to a relatively small number of cell towers in specific remote areas."

Mozilla is testing a free, built-in VPN for Firefox that routes traffic through Mozilla-managed servers directly in the browser. The Register reports: According to a staff post on Mozilla Connect, the company's idea-sharing platform, Firefox VPN is still an experimental feature in the early stages of development, but users will be selected at random to test it "over the next few months." Moz describes the feature as one that will sit beside the search bar on Firefox, routing web traffic through a Mozilla-managed VPN server, concealing the user's real IP address while adding a layer of encryption to their communications. Firefox VPN is a different project entirely from Mozilla VPN, a separate, paid-for product. The Firefox version will be free to use and confined to the browser itself, while Mozilla VPN can be used by up to five devices at a time.

The Moz staffer on the product team who announced the feature said of the upcoming beta test: "We'll start simple, then gradually add new capabilities while learning how it impacts browsing, usage, and overall satisfaction. "Our long-term vision is ambitious: to build the best VPN-integrated browser on the market." In response to feedback, the staffer noted that while it will be a desktop browser feature first, "mobile is definitely a natural next step."